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IN i HE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
-oooOooo-
STAII 01 U I AH, 
Phiniil'l :iiid Appellee, 
vs. 
GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case I ^ \ \ 
Priority No. 2 
This defendant has a limited I'» nivani' UMI Jaiiiagi, ,IIK1 HI L \icnsive 
history of social disorders involving his community. In summary, this defendant has a 
tt;iide!ii;,,l in hi, nhuoxioi is and repetition causing discomfort for those around him, In 
1995, after being warned not • • v unreasonable 
durations any longer, the defendant was charged and convicted of retail theft for 
consuming too many free refills of coffee. The defendant was placed on probation and 
at the State's rniin^f im ludol <in onln picicnting the defendant from approaching and 
making contact with the witnesses, court officials, ,iml menu -TS, ot thr linn f t'unty 
Attorney's Office apparently due to their discomfort arround the defendant. 
On February 28, 1997, the defendant allegedly approached the witness in 
Albertson's grocery store and conveyed a threat to her. This appeal is the from two 
proceedings. The defendant was convicted in the 1997 case by a jury for retaliation 
against a witness and the judge found the defendant had violated the terms of his 
probation in the 1995. The defendant believes that as a matter of law, the State failed 
it's burden in both matters. The trial court lacked jurisdiction in the probation case as 
the case had been closed and the State failed to prove the element of a threat to do 
bodily injury in the criminal proceeding. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 
(1953, as amended) (2)(e) (appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except 
those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony). The appellant appeals 
the final order and judgment of the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Iron County 
involving his conviction of Retaliation Against a Witness in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-508 (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
(A) Probation Violation, case no. 951501084: 
2 
1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error h; shitiinj.- (IK huidcu 
efendant to show jurisdiction over the probationer existed. 
2. Whetb uated probation upon payment of the $75.00 
fine to the court. 
3. Whether the State proved the probationer had adequate notice of the terms 
o f i >i . .n<- - i . 
(B) Retaliation Against a Witness, case no. 971500209: 
1. Whether the State proved every element of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt and tli.il ilv Irml uunl tmniiik'J reversible error by denying the defendant's 
motion to dismiss. 
2 Whether the trial court commited reversible error by not reducing, ilif 
« k\t'i\v Ifoiii Retaliation Against a Witness to Harassment or Stalking. The punishment 
is disproportionate * duct is not felonious. 
Whether the trial court unjustly denied tin ilcli nil;mf Imm nnuHIUL 
evidence of the prior crime when the State's key witness addressed the prior arrest. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
(A) (l)-(2). The trial court terminated probation upon h v* •*•• 
fine and the trial court lost jurisdiction over the defendant. Moreover, the State failed 
3 
it's burden to show that jurisdiction existed over the defendant and the trial court 
unjustly placed the burden on the defendant. 
A court must have subject matter jurisdiction to have the power and authority to 
decide a controversy. Without subject matter jurisdiction a court cannot 
proceed. See Fauver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275, 1276 n.3 (Utah App. 1990). 
We review a lower court's determination of whether it has subject matter 
jurisdiction under a correction of error standard. Id at 1276. [District] courts 
are courts of limited jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-2 (1992). 
Burns Chiropractic v. Allstate Ins., 851 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct App. 1993) ("Circuit" 
changed to "District" by the defendant). 
(A) (3). No evidence existed that the defendant had notice of the 
Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, and Order of Probation. 
The trial court's finding that Kasco was "on notice" and the noncompetition 
covenant began to run in August 1988 involves a question of fact and a question 
of law. Since the finding that Kasco was on notice was a question of fact, we 
reverse only if we find it clearly erroneous. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); State v. 
Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991). However, the effect of that notice, 
which presumably led the trial court to find an anticipatory repudiation, is a 
question of law which we review for correctness. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991); State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d at 425. 
Kasco Services v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86 (Utah 1992). 
(B) (1) - (2). The trial Court improper determined that the State met it's 
burden to prove each element of the offense charged and submitted the case to the jury. 
Moreover, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to reduce the charge to a 
violation of Harassment or Stalking. 
[T]he 'trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a question of law.'" State 
v. Garcia, 866 P.2d 5, 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Ward v. Richfield City, 
4 
798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990)). "'We accord a lower court's statutory 
interpretations no particular deference but assess them for correctness, as we do 
any other conclusion of law.'" Id. (quoting Salt Lake City v. Emerson, 861 P.2d 
443, 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted)). 
State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
(B)(3). The trial court unjustly prevented thr iiilnn Mhilir nt tin prim 
crime upon the defendant's motion after the State's witness raised the issue of the 
defendant'1. juim' ;invst. 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Addendum * j 
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/. PROBATION VIOLATION 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case: 
This case arises from an appeal of the final judgments of the Fifth District 
Court for a probation violation of a Retail Theft case (a Class C Misdemeanor), (r. at 
73), because the defendant allegedly and repeatedly made contact with the convicting 
witness. Evidently from review of the order in question, the defendant was prhibited 
from making contact with said witness. The State prepared the order, but no evidence 
in the record exists that the order was provided to the defendant, either in person or by 
mail. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss and the trial court denied said motion 
and affirmed the violation while unjustly imposing the burden of proving jurisdiction 
upon the defendant. (R. at 117-21). 
//. Course of the Proceedings: 
On March 25, 1996, the defendant was convicted by bench trial of Retail 
Theft, a Class C Misdemeanor, for having too many refills (r. at 172.22) at a Walmart 
snack bar on November 15, 1995. (R. at 172.6). On that date, Mr. Spainhower was 
apparently told he could no longer take extra cups of coffee and he couldn't stay there 
for long periods of time. (R. at 172.8). The defendant testified that he was told that he 
6 
couldn't be there too long, he could have all the refills he wanted I mi il:i' in I nil 10 
leave within a specific period of time. (R. at 172.30). Apparently, the store manager 
also told Mr. Spainhow • •* 72.30). Mr 
Spainhower's response was that he was just trying to be a • il i i ci lirn I; it 
172.3u i uring the State's cross examination of Mr. Spainhower, the State raised the 
questio clef' iitlani t ompetency asking him if he had the ability to count from 
one to six and whether he was on i Spainhower 
reported that he could count because he obtained a G.E.D., but that he was on 
dis;11 1111 \ it that point the defense objected and the court conducted a bench 
conference. Upor _-».t^c. the court quickly wrapped up the case 
and found the Mr. Spainhower guilty, imposed n ^ l and 
imposed a term of probation not to follow or harrass individuals involved with the case, 
'in lijilii'i?, Will Is Lin uic toun, and the Iron County Attorney's Office.2 See 3-25-96 
Trial Transcript exsurp, Addendum , 
Subsequently, Mr. Spainhower requests a copy of the 
. . - • court prepared the Judgment, Sentence (Commitment) dated March 25, 
1996. «,K. at 22-23^ equently, the following day, the State prepared 
the Judgment Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence 
* Due to Mr. Spainhower's disability. (R. at 172.34, ?S">. 
2
 This term was imposed withoi it •• .: -dcna: lo support such a 
requirement. 
7 
was entered April 1, 1996. (R. at 24-26)(Addendum D). No evidence exists in the 
record of either orders being received by the defendant, not even through counsel. 
At a subsequent review hearing, the court reviewed the case and there is a 
court docket entry that the case was dismissed. (R. at 86). The defendant failed to 
attend the review hearing. (R. at 86). 
Nonetheless, on February 28, 1997, Mr. Spainhower was charged with 
retaliation against a witness-the nature of the second appeal. Subsequently, the State 
filed it's motion on March 21, 1997, seeking an Order to Show Cause for the reported 
violation and subsequent charge of retaliation. Mr. Spainhower retained counsel, D. 
Bruce Oliver and counsel filed his appearance on April 9, 1997. (R. at 51). On April 
15, 1997, an Order to Show Cause was issued by the Honorable J. Philip Eves of the 
Fifth District Court. (R. at 60); it was scheduled for 1:30 p.m. for May 6th. 
At the Order to Show Cause, Mr. Spainhower denied the allegations and 
an evidentiary hearing was set for June 6, 1997. (R. at 65, 68). 
During the June 6th hearing, the defense moves to dismiss the matter and 
the parties argue the matter. (R. at 73). The defense argues that Judge Braithwaite had 
dimissed the case on April 29, 1996 and that the terms of the probation had expired. 
(R. at 72). As a result, the cort required clarification, took the matter under 
advisement, and ordered the parties to submit memoranda. (R. at 72). The parties did. 
(See memorandum in support of dismissal (Addendum E), and in opposition 
8 
(Addendum F)). (R. at 84-106, 74-81). Oral arguments were set for August 4, 1997. 
(R. at 83). On August 4, 1997, the trial court took the matter under advisement and 
stated it would issue a written opinion. (R. at 115). On August 22, 1997, the trial court 
issued it's opinion against the defendant. (R. at 117-21; Addendum G).3 An order was 
prepared by the State and submitted on September 8, 1997. (R. at 126). 
Thereafter, the defendant timely moved for reconsideration on September 
18, 1997. (R. at 132) arguing against the trial court's belief that it was the defendant 
burden to show to probation versus the State's burden to show the existent of probation. 
The State responded, (r. at 152) and the motion was denied. On November 17, 1997, 
the trial court conducted a review hearing. (R. at 155). 
///. Disposition in Trial Court: 
At the November 17, 1997 review hearing, the trial court found that the 
defendant did violate his probation, the probation was revoked and Mr. Spainhower 
was ordered to serve 60 days in the County Jail. Further, the trial court required the 
committment to run concurrent with the diagnostic evaluation related to the Retaliation 
Against a Witness case. (R. at 155, 158-156; Addendum H). The defendant appealed. 
3
 Note: that up until this point, the trial court had called the offense a class C 
Misdemeanor consistent with the March 25, 1996 commitment order, now as a result of 
this ruling the court call's the offense a class B Misdemeanor consistent with the second 
order in question entered March 26, 1996. 
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IV, Statement of Facts: 
See part III above.4 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Three main issues are on appeal regarding this matter: (1) The lack of 
jurisdiction of the trial court to determine a probation violation. The case had been 
closed by Judge Braithwaite on April 29, 1996 by completion of the payment of his 
fine. (2) The trial court improperly placed the burden of persuasion onto the 
defendant to determine whether the trial court had jurisdiction rather than onto 
the State. In criminal and subsequent proceedings, the State maintains the burden of 
determining jurisdiction. (3) The lack of notice of the April 1, 1996 order and the 
obvious confusion caused between that and the March 25, 1996 order. Neither 
order indicates that the defendant had notice of his probation terms and no service of 
the order was accomplished, in spite of Mr. Spainhower's request for a copy of the 
order. Furthermore, it is clear that the order is in error as the entire proceedings 
indicated a class C misdemeanor until after the probation violation was determined by 
4
 The course of the proceedings are the nature of this appeal. 
10 
the trial court. At that point, the court began referring to the offense as a class B 
misdemeanor.5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED THE MOTION TO DISMISS. 
A. Lack of Notice; Trial Court's Own Termination of Probation Upon 
Payment of Fine. 
Mr. Spainhower's motion to dismiss was valid for either of two reasons. 
Addendum D attached herewith is the judgment which was prepared by the Iron County 
Attorney's Office and submitted to the Court. Said document was never served upon 
the defendant or his counsel. This document was never approved as to form or content. 
There is no certificate of mailing to anyone. The Order contains gratuitous language 
which was not ordered by the court. Addendum B which is the trial transcript shows 
that Mr. Spainhower specifically requested a copy of the order. The judge responded 
that the defendant would receive a copy of the order after Mr. Brickey typed it up. 
This never did occur, the defendant never did receive a copy of the order. 
The first point which would require a dismissal of this case is that the case 
5
 At sentencing the offense was treated as a class Bmisdemeanor and the Utah 
Board of Pardons has considered the offense as a class B misdemeanor in determining a 
parole date. 
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was closed by Judge Braithwaite on April 29, 1996. This was indicated in the Docket 
of this case which was attached as Exhibit 3 of the defendant's motion to dismiss. (R. at 
86). The argument was raised at the time of the hearing at the Order of Show Cause. 
The trial court denied the motion at that time; however, the transcript included herewith 
clarified the facts of this issue. The Court on page 35, line 9 of the 3-25-96 trial 
transcript stated: "It's not a big case, but it's still a violation." The Judge set a review 
date in this matter of April 29, at 10:30 a.m., that was the same date the fine of $75.00 
was due. The fine was paid as ordered. The judge did not specify a probationary 
period. The probation period of one year was gratuitously added ex-parte by the 
County Attorney's Office when they prepared the second order. The review date set by 
Judge Braithwaite and contained within the order was the time within which the court 
expected performance and was the date set to close the case. Judge Braithwaite 
routinely sets a review dates in less important cases and upon the payment of the fines 
he closes the case. This case is neither unique nor unusual in that context. Judge 
Braithwaite closed this case as he would any other minor theft case under similar 
circumstances. Judge Braithwaite's closing of the case should not be summarily 
disregarded, when indeed it follows Judge Braithwaite's standard procedure. The 
addition of the probationary period by the County Attorney's Office should not 
prejudice Mr. Spainhower. To allow this to go unchecked would be a clear violation of 
due process in this case. Mr. Spainhower was never adequately informed of what was 
12 
expected of him. Mr. Spainhower was not given notice of the court's order. Further 
with the additions by the County Attorney's Office, there is significant confusion in the 
obligations of Mr. Spainhower. 
The second point for which this Order to Show Cause should be dismissed 
is that the time had run and that the defendant's probation had terminated by operation 
of law. Utah Code Annotated Section 77-18-1 (11) (b) provides: 
The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show 
cause or a warrant by the court. 
Id. This provision of the Code provides that there are two different situations which 
will toll the running of the probationary period. These situations are 1) when there has 
been a violation report filed with the court; and 2) the issuance of an order to show 
cause or warrant of arrest by the court. The first situation is a document which is 
prepared and generated by Adult Parole and Probation as a result of their supervision of 
the probationer. Mr. Spainhower was not supervised by the Department of Adult 
Parole and Probation, nor did they file a violation report. The second method involves 
the issuance of an order to show cause or a warrant of arrest. These two documents 
are generated by either the court or the prosecutor's office. Utah Code Annotated 
Section 77-18-1 (12 (b) provides: 
(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to 
constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized 
probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe 
13 
that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is justified, 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause it shall cause to be served on 
the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order to 
show cause why his probation should not be revoked, modified, or extended. 
Id. This provision indicates that in order for the court to issue a warrant or order to 
show cause pursuant to this provision there must first be submitted an affidavit to the 
court. The code provisions require that the affidavit must allege facts with 
particularity. In this case there are only general allegations contained within the 
affidavit. Paragraph 4 (a) and (b) are the salient paragraphs and they are only general 
in nature. Paragraph 4 (b) of the affidavit of Terry Petersen contains names not 
specifically enumerated by Judge Braithwaite in court, they were requested by Mr. 
Brickey, however the judge did not enumerate them. Judge Braithwaite told Mr. 
Brickey to include in his order the list of names and then to provide a copy of the order 
to Mr. Spainhower. The list of names was included however the list was never 
provided to Mr. Spainhower. 
The reference specifically to an affidavit in connection with an order to 
show cause or a warrant of arrest indicates that the filing of the affidavit is not 
comparable to the filing of a violation report. An affidavit is for the purpose of 
allowing the judge to determine from the detailed facts whether there is probable cause 
to determine whether or not an order to show cause should be issued. When this 
method is employed it is the issuance of the order to show cause which tolls the running 
of the probationary period. In the Affidavit of Terry Petersen he specifically requests 
14 
that the court issue an order to show cause directing and requiring the defendant to 
appear before said court and show cause, if any he has, why the aforesaid period of 
probation should not be revoked. It is clear that this affidavit was specifically prepared 
and submitted in support of the issuance of an order to show cause. It is likewise 
interesting that along with this affidavit was also submitted a Bench Warrant and an 
Order to Show Cause. Under these circumstances it is the issuance of either of the 
Bench Warrant or the Order to Show Cause which tolls the running of probation. 
B. Unjust Shift of Burden to the Defendant. 
In the trial court's August 21st decision, Judge Eves stated, "Apparently 
at the time Judge Braithwaite entered his judgment in this case and placed the defendant 
on probation, he stated that the probation was to continue for one year from March 25, 
1996." This assumption by this Court is erroneous. In this matter, Judge Braithwaite 
imposed a fine of $75 fine in this case and scheduled a review on April 29, 1996, at 
10:30 a.m. apparently intending to close the matter. This matter had been a class C 
misdemeanor offense. 
The trial court further stated, "The defendant is the moving party in this 
case and has the burden or [sic] establishing that his motion is well taken.6 The 
6
 The defendant does not concede that he has the burden as the "moving party"; 
rather the defendant objects on the grounds that it is the burden of the prosecutor to 
demonstrate that the defendant violated his probation and/or that probation was not 
terminated prior to the "would be" violation. 
15 
defendant has failed to demonstrate that Judge Braithwaite intended to revoke the 
probation order previously entered in this case or to terminate the probation before it 
had run its course." This conclusion of law is erroneous. 
Contrary to the decision in this matter the defendant has met any burden 
posed by the trial court to demonstrate that Mr. Spainhower's probation was terminated 
prior to the filing of the March 21, 1997 violation report. At the time of oral 
arguments, the defendant presented with his motion a copy of this case's docket (a 
court record) that showed the case was dismissed by Judge Braithwaite well before 
March 21st. As a matter of fact, Bruce Oliver had thereafter discussed with Judge 
Braithwaite the Judge's policy regarding dismissals upon payment of fines.7 The Judge 
indicated that upon payment of a fine the court does dismiss the matter. In this case, 
that is just what occurred even though the defendant was not present at the review 
hearing. 
The Utah Supreme Court in In re State ex rel. Graham, 170 P.2d 172, 
110 Utah 159 (1946), stated: 
A presumption of regularity exists in favor of records which come to this court 
for review. Deletions, interlineations and changes in the documents comprising 
a record are presumed to have been made before those documents were filed and 
acted upon or by proper amendments thereafter. This presumption of regularity 
7
 See D. Bruce Oliver's Affidavit Supporting Reconsideration dated September 18, 
1997. (R. at 140-141). Mr. Oliver discussed the judge's courtroom policy regarding this 
issue on or about August 19, 1997 when he was in Cedar City on another matter. 
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must exist in order to expedite the final determination of cases and to discourage 
attacks on court records on merely technical grounds. The presumption is 
justified by the high quality of men and women who are the judges and 
commissioners and clerks who have the duty to make the records and the 
responsibility of their custody. Further, to falsify court records is a felony 
(Section 103-26-70, 71, U.C.A. 1943). It is reasonable to presume that those 
having custody of court records and all other persons having access to those 
records will not commit a crime by falsifying same. 
Id. The same presumption exists in this case. The defendant properly presented this 
issue to this Court and the challenge of the existence of a dismissal is the prosecution's 
burden and is not left for the court to surmise. 
Moreover, during the hearing, the dismissal was discussed at length with 
this Court and counsel provided the Court with the transcript relevant to the issue. The 
defendant requests that this Court refer back to the transcript. Clearly, upon review the 
trial court should have found the burden of persuasion has been met. This contention 
runs consistent with the presumption of innocense and the burden to prove guilt is on 
the prosecution. 
This Court has ruled on a matter with a similar arguement that Mr. 
Spainhower urges in this matter. In State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466 (Utah 1988), this 
Court addressed the issue of jurisdiction, rebuttable presumptions, and burdens of proof 
in criminal proceedings. This Court stated: 
Due Process requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every 
fact necessary to constitute the crime charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
364 (1970). In criminal cases, the prosecution is often aided by procedural 
devices which "require (in the case of a presumption) or permit (in the case of an 
inference) the trier of fact to conclude that the prosecution has met its burden of 
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proof with respect to the presumed or inferred fact by having satisfactorily 
established other facts." Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702 n.31 (1975). 
Since these devices shift the burden of production or persuasion to the defendant 
by requiring him or her to present some evidence contesting the otherwise 
presumed or inferred fact, these devices must satisfy certain due process 
requirements. IdL 
!,[I]n criminal cases, the ultimate test of any [evidentiary] device's 
constitutional validity in a given case remains constant: the device must not 
undermine the factfinder's responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by 
the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. 
Chambers, 709 P.2d 321, 325 (Utah 1985) (quoting County Court v. Allen, 
442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979)). The use of any mandatory rebuttable presumption 
which "requires the jury to find the presumed element unless the defendant 
persuades the jury that such a finding is unwarranted" is one such evidentiary 
device found to be unconstitutional. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 n.2 
(1985). See also State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d at 326; State v. Turner, 736 
P.2d 1043, 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Both Chambers and Turner involved challenges to an identical jury instruction 
taken verbatim from Utah's possession of stolen property statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1987). That statute provides that possession of property 
recently stolen, when no satisfactory explanation is made, should be deemed 
prima facie evidence that the person in possession stole the property. IcL The 
Utah Supreme Court in Chambers and this court in Turner found that the 
instruction in question was a mandatory rebuttable presumption as defined by the 
United States Supreme Court in Franklin and was thus unconstitutional. 709 
P.2d at 326; 736 P.2d at 1045. In both cases, the constitutionally defective 
instruction was followed by yet another instruction which defined "prima facie" 
as "a fact presumed to be true unless disproved by some evidence to the 
contrary." 709 P.2d at 326; 736 P.2d at 1044. Our Supreme Court and this 
court found that this instruction could well have indicated to jurors that die 
defendant was required to disprove guilt, resulting in an impermissible shift in 
the burden of proof to the defendant. 709 P.2d at 326; 736 P.2d at 1045. 
Therefore, even if the first instruction did not meet the definition of a mandatory 
rebuttable presumption, use of the second instruction would itself have required 
reversal because it relieved the state of its burden of proof. 709 P.2d at 326. 
In this case, the state conceded that it could not prove that the offense of 
consumption was committed in Utah, but nonetheless argued there is a 
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"presumption" that consumption occurred within the state unless rebutted by 
evidence to the contrary. The court adopted this view and found that, absent 
testimony to the contrary from defendant, the "natural inference" and "statistical 
probability" was that the drinking occurred in the vicinity of the arrest. 
Notwithstanding the court's characterization of its basis for finding defendant 
guilty as a "factual assumption" rather than a "legal presumption," we find the 
court's approach unconstitutional because, semantics aside, it creates precisely 
the type of evidentiary device prohibited by Chambers and Turner. The 
approach "requires the [fact-finder] to find the element unless the defendant 
persuades the [fact-finder] that such a finding is unwarranted." State v. 
Chambers, 709 P.2d at 326; State v. Turner, 736 P.2d at 1045. 
Moreover, even if the evidentiary device used in this case does not fit within the 
Chambers-Turner definition of a mandatory rebuttable presumption, it 
nonetheless has the effect of relieving the state of its burden of proof on the fact 
of jurisdiction and is thus unconstitutional under the standard articulated in In re 
Winship, requiring the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every 
fact necessary to constitute the crime charged. 397 U.S. at 364. Despite the 
state's concession to the contrary, jurisdiction is not an element of the offense in 
this case. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3) (1978). However, the rule 
established in Winship is not limited to those facts essential to establish the 
elements of the offense in the technical sense. Cf Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 
684, 698-99 & n.25 (1979) (Winship rule "is concerned with substance rather 
than this kind of formalism" and is not "limited to those facts that constitute a 
crime as defined by state law."). 
Id. Sorenson may not be on point with this matter, but the rationale behind the decision 
holds true requiring this Court to review the trial court's decision. In this matter, like 
in Sorenson, the trial court unjustly imposed the burden on the defendant to persuade 
the court regarding jurisdiction. The trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to 
dismiss and the subsequent denial of the defendant's motion for reconsideration was 
plain error. The trial court should have dismissed the matter because the State failed to 
show that the defendant was on probation and it failed to show that the defendant 
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knowingly violationed the terms of his probation. 
In Sorenson, this Court concluded: 
Without regard to the location of defendant's arrest, we find the presumption or 
assumption used by the court unconstitutional in that it shifted the burden of 
proof on the fact of jurisdiction to defendant in violation of the due process 
clause of Article I Section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
Id. Mr. Spainhower urges this Court to conclude the same and reverse this matter with 
instructions to discharge the defendant as it had in Sorenson. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Spainhower has been unjustly treated in this matter. The trial court 
concluded that Mr. Spainhower violated his probation. Unfortunately, the trial court 
exceeded its authority in several ways. The trial court lost jurisdiction over the 
defendant because Judge Braithwaite had closed this matter. Moreover, Mr. 
Spainhower, never had notice of what his terms of probation were nor the duration of 
said probation. Finally, the trial court improperly placed the burden onto the defendant 
rather than the State regarding the violation. 
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//. RETALIATION AGAINST A WITNESS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case: 
This case arises from an appeal of the final judgment and guilty verdict 
of Mr. Spainhower for Retaliation Against a Witness, a Third Degree Felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (1953, as amended). (R. at 394.135). The 
State failed to prove each element of the crime as required by Utah Code Ann. §76-1-
501 (1953, as amended). Upon closing of the case, the defense moved to dismiss the 
matter and the trial court denied the motion. (R. at 394.89). Instead, the trial court 
submitted the matter to the jury and the jury convicted the defendant based upon the 
passion and prejudice. 
//. Course of the Proceedings: 
On March 4, 1997, the State filed an Information alleging retaliation 
against a witness. The Information was filed because the defendant allegedly 
approached the witness, Sherry Reeves in Albertson's grocery store and said, "I'm 
going to get you." (R. at 300.5) However, later at trial the witness apparently lied 
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claiming the defendant said, "I'm going to get you for lying in court, you fat birth." 
abd followed her around the store carrying a non-dairy creamer container. She also 
reported in the Order to Show Cause proceeding that the defendant had run into on 
multiple occasions. This fact was omitted at the time of trial. 
Prior to this date, the defense had filed a motion to reduce the charges to 
harassment or stalking on June 20, 1997. (R. at 248). Said motion was based upon the 
allegations that the defendant had ran into the witness, Sherry Reeves, on multiple 
occasions. (R. at 300.5-6; see memorandum in support, Addendum I). The State 
responded claiming that a reduction was not warranted as the February 28, 1997 
incident was "only one encounter." The State denied that there where any prior 
incidents. (R. at 250; see opposition memorandum, Addendum J). Subsequently, the 
trial court conducted a motion hearing and took the matter under advisement. (R. at 
277). Based the State's argument, the trial court denied the defendant's motion. (R. at 
280; see Memorandum Decision, Addendum K). 
Thereafter trial convened and the jury convicted Mr. Spainhower. 
77/. Disposition in Trial Court: 
The trial court denied Mr. Spainhower's motion to reduce charge. The 
trial court sustained the State's objection when the defense attempted to have the 
witness testify about the nature of the prior criminal proceeding after the witness 
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testified about the defendant's 
Spainhower's motion to dismiss for lack of evidence. 
i \. statement of Facts: 
iL Prior proceeding, Order to Show Cause. 
The witness (hereinafter "Reeves") testified at the order to show cause 
hearing that on Februar> «..\ i vv , u., defendant approached her at Albertson's 
grew • • • nukk' eye ui II.H I "' 'I crever he ran into 
me, wherever he followed me." (R. at 5). Reeves testified that Spainhowe i t :)I i 1 le ir, 
"I'm going to get you," (R. at 300.5,7). The judge asked for clarification and 
spt\ i: .i . . * .jUL^i^ ... ._ quuu in. \\,)rJ:5. ;>he responded, "I'm going to get you" 
"That's all he Miki r .< |in vain n«i phi I in In i h i iiilliu uiunsri in 
rushing through her response to the judge's query. (R. at 394.65-68). 
At that same hearing, Reeves reported that she felt like she was being 
harass* n) In, l\ 11 Spaniln iw i i U at A \\ I,iS She also testified as to the number of 
times Mr. Spainhower had run into the Reeves / U m <0(i "mi Rfrvrs sluled 
I can't number the times [she has had dealings with the defendant]. Albertson's, 
in front of Pay less, in front of Smith's. He's followed me all over. He's passed 
me in his car, following me up and down, back and forth, in front of me, behind 
me, beside me, in front of me and lailghing. 
Id. The defense, brought out that this is a small town and thnv air only ilirn; smu's 
and one shoe store in Cedar City (R at 300.8-10) Meaning the likelihood that Mr. 
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Spainhower and Reeves would "run into" one another is great. (R. at 300.5). 
B. Trial Proceeding. 
In opening arguments, the State identifies that it would prove that Mr. 
Spainhower's motive was to harass her, (r. at 394.35), not to cause bodily injury. The 
difference between the defense's urged misdemeanor conduct versus the State's 
suggested felony conduct. 
During trial, Reeves fails to alleged a threat of bodily injury. At no time 
during either proceedings was any evidence introduced to the contrary. The following 
facts are the only facts presented to the jury. Moreover, the witnesses testimony is in 
greater detail than that provided during the Order to Show Cause proceeding and is 
likely the product of suggestion as the witness and the State walked through the store 
and allegedly refreshed the witnesses testimony. (R. at 394.78). 
Reeves testified that she entered into Albertson's on February 28th. She 
testified-in detail-the aisles she went down. (R. at 394.47,48,50). She provided a 
detailed history of her occupation, her family and unrelated personal history. (R. at 37-
39).8 She also, testified in great detail as to the products she purchased. However, this 
suggested list of items while strolling through the store aisles is only generalized and 
8
 Apparently, the State's attempt to build a feeling of an acquaintance between the 
jury and the witness. 
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not a specific recollection (11 fir tkilr in qiK'siinn il<! , ! I'M (>V , Is( MUM 
explanation, Reeves explains early in the trial that she is afraid of Mr. Spainhower. (R. 
at 394 .49). •••. 
Nniu'dk'k'N!., jill (lu'f.i: l;n is ( ml in prciudiu" I he delciklanl in Lhe eyes of 
the jury. They are all irrelevant as to the conduct justifying a felony convictioi i :)f 
Retaliation Against a Witness. Conceedingly, Reeves was a witness in Mr. 
Spainho w er's pi ioi com Ictloi 1 of i e tail theft However, the defendant did not convey a 
threat to do bodil 
Reeves testified at trial, that after picking up her cheese and looking for 
milk next she saw Mr. Spainhower, looking at her while tossing a non-dairy creamer 
coin in iiiM" ln standing there and staring.
 Ki, a. 3^4.43) ,if 
she reported that he carried only the creamer 
394.49) She claims that he called her "pitiful." Furthermore, the extent of the threat 
was testified to be, I m going to get you for lying in court, you fat bitch" as he walked 
Apparently, the State's attempt to build trust and reliability of the witnesses 
testimony for the jury's sake. However, clearly she indicated that she didn't remember 
back that far to February 28, 1997. She even admitted that she couldn't even remember 
back as far as her testimony at the June 10, 1997 preliminary hearing even though she has 
never testified before, (R. at 394.63,75,79). 
10
 Apparently drawing a nexus between the retail theft conviction of too many refills 
of coffee with the retaliation against her for the prior conviction. For this reason, the prior 
conviction was a probative evidence to the crime rather than prejudicial. 
past her.11 (R. at 394.51) No other statements or threats were alleged at trial. 
Reeves' additional testimony called the jury's attention to Mr. 
Spainhower's prior Wal-Mart arrest. (R. at 394.56). Upon cross examination by the 
defense, the State objected and the trial court sustained the objection. (R. at 394.57-
58).12 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Three main issues are on appeal regarding this matter: (1) The trial court 
committed reversible error by submitting this matter to the jury. Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1953, as amended), the defense moved to dismiss this matter 
upon conclusion of the State's case due to the absence of evidence pertaining to a 
"threat to do bodily injury." As a matter of law, the State failed to prove all the 
elements of the crime. (2) The trial court committed reversible error by not 
reducing the crime from a Third Degree Felony to a Misdemeanor. The 
defendant's conduct is no felonious, the witness testified that the defendant had 
followed her on numerous occasions. This conduct may constitute possible harassment 
11
 Apparently the product of suggestion, in light of the varied testimony from the 
June 6th proceeding. See, generally, State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). 
12
 The effect of the sustained objection precluded the defense from clarifying the 
basis for the arrest and thereby precluded the defense from removing the prejudice caused 
by the accidentally inclusion of evidence pertaining to prior bad acts. The evidence that 
the prior crime of a minor offense and the termination of probation would have removed 
possible prejudice. 
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o r s t a l k i n g c h a r g e s b u t TICK n l a l k i f i m i j i i u i n s i i w i n n ^ ml Hi T i n il1 Il 11 iiiiiii il iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiililii d 
reversible error by not allowing mitigating testimony about the defendant's prior 
bad act, I he witness was allowed to educate the jury about the defendant's prior 
arrest II: i it :: n :::i oss exai n Ii lation , tl le \ < - itne ss was not allowed to testify about the nature 
of the offense and other relevant conduct 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
MR. SPAINHOWER WAS WRONGFULLY CHARGED
 WITH RETALIATI0N 
AGAINST A WITNESS. 
A. Introduction. 
STALKING, Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-106.5 (1953, as amended), is, inter 
u .. Ki ^ : Misdemeanor when: 
. (2) A person is guilty of stalking who: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course o u K 
a specific person that would cause a reasonable person: 
(I) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate 
family; or 
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a member of his 
immediate family; 
(It! lias knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person: 
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to himself or 
a member of his family; or 
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of his immediate 
family will suffer emotional distress; and 
(c) whose conduct; 
(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily injury to himself or 
a member of his immediate family; or 
(ii) cause emotional distress in the spe i-l t, 
his immediate family. 
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Id. 
HARASSMENT, Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-106 (1953, as amended), is a 
Class B Misdemeanor when: 
[The actor], with intent to frighten or harass another, he communicates a 
written or recorded threat to commit any violent felony. 
IdL 
B. Grounds. 
The Grounds for this motion is that Mr. Spainhower is entitled to the 
benefit of the lessor penalty when certain conduct is prohibited by different or 
conflicting statutes. 
C. Case Law-State v. Shondel. 
A defendant is entitled to be charged under a statute carrying the lessor 
penalty. State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969). In Shondel, the Supreme Court 
agreed with the proposition advocated by the defendant "that the equal protection of the 
laws requires that they affect alike all persons similarly situated." Id. Consistently, the 
Court reasoned: 
[W]here there is doubt or uncertainty as to which of two punishments is 
applicable to an offense an accused is entitled to the benefit of the lesser. 
This impels the conclusion here that the clear, specific and lesser penalty 
prescribed for the offense as a misdemeanor . . . is the one which should 
be imposed. We say this mindful of our statute which provides that the 
common-law rule of strict construction of statutes is not applicable in this 
state. But it is our opinion the conclusion we have reached is in harmony 
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with that section's further mandate that our statutes should be "construed 
according to the fair import of their terms with a view to effect the objects 
of the statutes and to promote justice." 
Id. As a result the Shondel Court found the wrong sentence had been imposed and 
r c i i i t i i n l n ) l l u 1 tiKit11 i l i .n I I n I h r I n ill i . n i i i l H ll i .H Ihi i n mi mi icmlh fin c u u i l i l In ; : 
imposed. 
The case at hand is on point with Shondel. If is clear and undoubtful that 
llu n iiiiidiiul si lik In has \\\ in ikuhbi il I) llii \ iiJiiii and allegations made against Mr. 
Spainhower better describes violation of the Stalkin -n^ 
Utah Code; not the Retaliation Against a Witness provision. 
rI he victim in this proceeding reportedly indicated that Mr. Spainhower 
indicated that Mr. Spainhower had communicated a threat to her that he was <?o:ni? o 
get her. 
Meanwhile, the crime Mi. Spainhower has been charged with is 
Retalia* ->. 
RETALIATION AGAINST A WITNESS, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 
(1953, as amended), is a Third Degree Felony when: 
A person knowingly and intentionally communicated to a person would believe 
to be a threat to do bodily injury to the person, because of any act performed by 
the person in his capacity as a witness or informant in an official proceeding or 
investigation. 
Id. In light of the absence of the "threat to do bodily injury" the retaliation charge is 
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not an appropriate offense to allege. On the other hand, clearly the testimony above 
describes either offense of stalking or harassment. Reeves has testified that she feels 
threatened by Mr. Spainhower, that Mr. Spainhower is harassing her, and that Mr. 
Spainhower has ran into her and she has had dealing with him on multiple occasions. 
POINT II. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE 
ACTION FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE. 
The defense moved for a dismissal upon conclusion of the State's case on 
the basis that the State failed to prove all the element of the crime beyond reasonable 
doubt. 
A. Introduction. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-1-501 defines what an "Element of the 
offense" is by stating: 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each 
element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct proscribed, 
prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of the offense but 
shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
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because the State had failed to disturb the presumption of innocence In fhr i ! z 
State has failed to prove beyond the reasonable doubt that Mr. Spainhower committed 
Ilit I-, litii\ ol ivctali.itii>ii Against a Witness in violation o; Section /t>-8-508 of the I Jtah 
Code. 
In order to convict Mr. Spainhower of Retaliation Against a Witness, the 
prosecution must prove all the elements which are: 
1 . 1 Ii ill in 1 i r h i i i j i \ „ H ' l l 1 ! 1 ! " ill \ III in; i | K\ in in «, MI 11 in. I ' l l L i l L e t 
2. The defendant communicated to a person a threat, 
3. That a reasonable person would believe to be a threat to do bodily injury to 
tl le pei son, 
4.. •:. Because of any act pei foi i i led oi I: : 1: e p 51 foi n 1 z- :i h] ' the person in his 
capacity as a witness or informant in an official proceeding or investigation. 
At question here is element no 3 as listed above. "That a reasonable 
p e i s t H I I N D I I I I I In l inn 1 1  In I  d i n 11 i n i l l ! I U M | I I \ ij 111111 in, i n illiiin 11 LJis111 in ill i l i c U K t l i n ( h i s 
matter, never was there any testimony or other evidence provided that demonstrated a 
"threat to do bodily injury to the person" occurred. Specifically, Ms. Reeves described 
]\ !i Spaii it io\* ei as fc I lc 1 v ii lg :)i stalkii lg her tl iroughout uic store and 'then 
communicated to her, "I'm going to gel mil" \\r " I'm i'oiiii'" In pyi MIM fm lum 1 
court, you fat bitch"-whichever you want to believe. At any rate, this conveyed threat 
falls short of one conveying a threat to cause physical pain, illness, or physical 
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B. Definitions. 
Retaliation Against a Witness is defined as: 
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if, believing that an official 
proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he attempts to 
induce or otherwise cause a person to: 
(a) testify or inform falsely; 
(b) withhold any testimony, information, document, item; 
(c) elude legal process summoning him to provide evidence; or 
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he has been 
summoned. 
(2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if he: 
(a) commits any unlawful act in retaliation for anything done by another as a 
witness or informant; 
(b) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit in consideration of his doing 
any of the acts specified under Subsection (1); or 
(c) communicates to a person a threat that a reasonable person would believe 
to be a threat to do bodily injury to the person, because of any act performed or to 
be performed by the person in his capacity as a witness or informant in an official 
proceeding or investigation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (1997) (Emphasis added). 
Bodily Injury is defined as: 
"Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical 
condition. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (3) (1997). 
C. The State Failed to Prove thai Defendant Conveyed a Threat to Cause 
Physical Pain, Illness, or Any Physical Condition. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 requires the prosecution to prove all the 
elements of a crime beyond the reasonable doubt or the defendant must be acquitted 
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condition. A reasonable person could not believe just 111 nlie^al st.itcmenl alone lo 
means a threat to do bodily injury. 
Bodily Injury is defined by ( Uta Code Ami , o-i-(n)h3) as, "physical 
••ilness, or a m Ii i lpaii i nent of ph> sical coi lditioi i " I here ai 11 nanj othei •' •  ;" 
interpretations that can be perceived from said statement other than that of bodily 
injury. (E.g., harass, follow, intimidate, sue, etc.) These acts may be felonious under 
felonious under either subsections 76-8-508(1) or 76-8-508(2). 
At any rate, the prosecution, failed to introduce any evidence that fulfills 
the element of the crime pertaining to bodily injury, therefore the conviction will not 
^ v ithsta rid appellate i e\ lew. 
The Utah Court of Appeals, in State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466 (1988), 
discussed due process concerns, when the State fails to prove beyond reasonable doubt 
t . t /^a ..: -riminal charge. . :u .:n concluded, I;., state, 
however, put on absolutely no evidence ot |iins<lh Ii '-1 inslrud eiT - lln 
presumption that the consumption of alcohol occurred with the state. Based thereupon, 
the Court remanded the matter to the trial court with instructions to discharge the 
defendant. 
Even though the issue in Sorenson was one of jurisdiction because the 
defendant was arrested two miles outside of the State of Utah, nonetheless, the 
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reasoning holds true in this case. Mr. Spainhower is protected by due process, due 
process requires the State to prove each and every fact beyond the reasonable doubt 
necessary to constitute the crime charged. Supra. In this case, the State failed to prove 
the most critical element of the crime which constitutes the felony aspect of the 
Retaliation Against a Witness. That element is a threat to do bodily injury. No such 
evidence was provided. The mere threat, "I'm going to get you" is not sufficient to 
convey a threat to do bodily injury to a reasonable person. 
This Court upon de novo review should conclude that as a matter of law, 
the trial court should have acquitted Mr. Spainhower, because the State failed to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant conveyed a threat to do bodily injury. 
POINT III. 
EVIDENCE OF THE PRIOR BAD ACT CAUSED UNDUE PREJUDICE AGAINST 
THE DEFENDANT CAUSE DISPROPORTIONATE CONVICTION. 
A. Evidence of Prior Crimes. 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. 
UtahR. Evid. 404(b). 
B. Inadmissible Except to Prove Other Than Character of Person in Order to 
Show Action in Conformity Therewith. 
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The test here is the probative value outweighs the potential prejudice 
caused b> tl le acii i i issioi 1 : f pi ioi bad coi ldi ict I lie probative value of the evidence 
must "outweigh its tendenc) to i infa Ill) pre ji idice the • cleft i ida i it in • :: i dei to be 
admissible" under Utah Rule of Evidence 403. In this matter, the testimonial evidence 
offered by Reeves pertaining to the defendant's prior conviction unfairly prejudiced 
l" In ')|ui]iiim< i i Hue linn, deil'ir*!1 ,iiirni|iiril I miiijuu IIH piejudiie tauscd in cioss-
examining the witness, the State objected and the trial court sustained the objection. 
The United States Supreme Court in Chambers v. Mississippi, 4! ~ ' ".S. 284 (1973) 
recognized ., JJL . .:,n: u) cross-examine is essential to a fair trial. By precluding the 
cross examination, the trial coi irt si lbstai itial can is sd tl le iefei idant to 1: e pi e judiced w hiel I 
resulted in an unfair trial. Clearly, the jury should have heard testimony that the prior 
arrest was for a minor offense and that the probation for the defendant had terminated. 
CONCLUSION 
Upon a review of these issues for correctness, tl lis I Ioi i Drablc < " 
overturn both appeals as a matter of law. 
RESPEC ITT II I * SI JBN II I FED this 12th da> of 
August, 1998. ' s> 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
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PREAMBLE 
£krj3t&fuJ to Almighty God far )]fe JIB 6 llharty we. $hej>eop)e 
of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate the principles of 
free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITU-
TION, .-. 1896 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Section 
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
2. [All political power inherent in the people.] 
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification to ote :>r 
hold office.] 
5. [Habeas corpus.] 
6. [Right to bear arms.] 
7. [Due process of law.] 
8. [Offenses bailable.] 
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.] 
10. [Trial by jury.] 
11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.] 
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of war-
rant.] 
15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
l€. (jSb imprisonment for de6t — Exception, f 
17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.] 
19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
2 1 . [Slavery forbidden.] 
22. [Private property for public use.] 
23 . [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
25. [Rights retained by people.] 
Section 
26. [Provisions tiandatory and prohibitory.] 
27. [Fundamental rights.] 
28. [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.] 
Section 1. [Inherent a n d inal ienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and 
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect 
property; to worship according to the dictates of their con-
sciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of tha t 
r ight . 1896 
Sec. 2. [All pol i t ica l p o w e r i n h e r e n t in t h e people . ] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free 
governments are founded on their authority for their equal 
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or 
reform their government as the public welfare may require. 
1896 
Sec. 3. [Utah i n s e p a r a b l e from t h e Union . ] 
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the Federal 
Union and the Constitution of the United States is tb.3 
supreme law of the land. 1896 
Sec. 4. [Rel igious l iber ty — No p r o p e r t y qual i f ica t ion 
to vo te or hold office.] 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State 
shall make no law respecting an establishment cf religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test 3hall be 
required as a qualification for any office ofpubiic trust or for 
any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent 
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State, 
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated 
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, 
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No 
property qualification shall be required of any person tc vote, 
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution. 1896 
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public 
safety requires it. 1896 
Sec. 6. [Right to b e a r arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for 
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the 
state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be 
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature 
from defining the lawful use of arms. 1984 (2nd s.s.) 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law. J 
No person shall be deprived cf life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 1896 
Sec. 3, jOffenses bailable.) 
(1) All persons charged wit: . -jr.tut M U . , j e . 
except: 
(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there is 
substantial evidence to support the charge; or 
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or 
parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous 
felony charge, when there is substantial evidence to 
support the new felony charge; or 
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated 
by statute as one for which bail may be denied, if there is 
% 
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substantial evidence to support the charge and the court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person 
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person 
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of 
the court if released on bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal 
only as prescribed by law. 1988 (2nd s.s.) 
Sec. 9. [Excess ive bail and fines — C r u e l p u n i s h -
men t s . ] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not 
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. 1896 
Sec . 10. [Trial by jury. ] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve 
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of 
no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature 
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event 
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-
fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases 
shall be waived unless demanded. 1996 
Sec . 11. [ C o u r t s o p e n — R e d r e s s of in jur ies . ] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
a party. 1896 
Sec . 12. [R igh t s of a c c u s e d p e r s o n s . ] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to ad-
vance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. 
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of tha t examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall pre-
clude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute 
or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 1994 
Sec. 13. [Prosecut ion by information or indictment — 
Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indict-
ment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination 
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be 
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by 
indictment, with or without such examination and commit-
ment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and 
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable s earches forbidden — Issu-
ance of warrant . ] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to 
be seized. 1896 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of 
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the 
t ruth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall 
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, 
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact. 1896 
Sec . 16. [No i m p r i s o n m e n t for debt — Except ion. ] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of 
absconding debtors. 1896 
Sec . 17. [Elect ions to be free — Soldiers vot ing.] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military, 
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the 
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their 
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be 
prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto l a w s — Impairing 
contracts . ] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the 
obligation of contracts shall be passed. 1896 
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war 
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid 
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on 
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act. 1896 
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil 
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in 
any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war 
except in a manner to be prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec . 21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within this State. 1896 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without jus t compensation. 1896 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise, 
privilege or immunity. 1896 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operat ion of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
1896 
Sec. 25. [Rights re ta ined by people.] 
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair 
or deny others retained by the people. 1896 
Sec. 26. [Provis ions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and 
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be 
otherwise. 1& 9 6 
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Sec. 21. [ F u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t s . ] 
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential 
to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free 
government. 1896 
Sec. 28. [Dec la ra t ion of t h e r i g h t s of c r i m e vict ims.] 
(1) To preserve and protect victims' rights to justice and due 
process, victims of crimes have these rights, as defined by law: 
(a) To be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity, 
and to be free from harassment and abuse throughout the 
criminal justice process; 
(b) Upon request, to be informed of, be present at, and 
to be heard at important criminal justice hearings related 
to the victim, either in person or through a lawful repre-
sentative, once a criminal information or indictment 
charging a crime has been publicly filed in court; and 
(c) To have a sentencing judge, for the purpose of 
imposing an appropriate sentence, receive and consider, 
without evidentiary limitation, reliable information con-
cerning the background, character, and conduct of a 
person convicted of an offense except that this subsection 
does not apply to capital cases or situations involving 
privileges. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as creating a 
cause of action for money damages, costs, or attorney's fees, or 
for dismissing any criminal charge, or relief from any criminal 
judgment. 
(3) The provisions of this section shall extend to all felony 
crimes and such other crimes or acts, including juvenile 
offenses, as the Legislature may provide. 
(4) The Legislature shall have the power to enforce and 
define this section by s ta tute . 1994 
ARTICLE II 
STATE BOUNDARIES 
Section 
1. [State boundaries.] 
Sec t ion 1. [S ta te b o u n d a r i e s . ] 
The boundaries of the State of U tah shall be as follows: 
Beginning at a point formed by the intersection of the 
thirty-second degree of longitude west from Washington, with 
the thirty-seventh degree of north latitude; thence due west 
along said thirty-seventh degree of north latitude to the 
intersection of the same with the thirty-seventh degree of 
longitude west from Washington; thence due north along said 
thirty-seventh degree of west longitude to the intersection of 
the same with the forty-second degree of north latitude; 
thence due east along said forty-second degree of north lati-
tude to the intersection of the same with the thirty-fourth 
degree of longitude west from Washington; thence due south 
along said thirty-fourth degree of west longitude to the inter-
section of the same with the forty-first degree of north lati-
tude; thence due east along said forty-first degree of north 
latitude to the intersection of the same with the thirty-second 
degree of longitude west from Washington; thence due south 
along said thirty-second degree of west longitude to the place 
of beginning. 1896 
ARTICLE III 
ORDINANCE 
[Religious toleration — Polygamy forbidden.] 
[Right to public domain disclaimed — Taxation of 
lands — Exemption.] 
[Territorial debts assumed.] 
[Free nonsectarian schools.] 
The following ordinance shall be irrevocable without the 
consent of the United States and the people of this State: 
[Rel ig ious t o l e r a t i o n — P o l y g a m y f o r b i d d e n j 
First: — Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is guaran-
teed. No inhabitant of this State shall ever be molested in 
person or property on account of his or her mode of religious 
worship; but polygamous or plural marriages are forever 
prohibited. 1896 
[Right to pub l i c d o m a i n d i s c l a i m e d — Taxa t ion of l a n d s 
— Exempt ion . ] 
Second: — The people inhabiting this State do affirm and 
declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the 
unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries 
hereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held 
by any Indian or Indian tribes, and that until the title thereto 
shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same 
shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United 
States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute 
jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States. 
The lands belonging to citizens of the United States, residing 
without this State shall never be taxed at a higher rate than 
the lands belonging to residents of this State; but nothing in 
this ordinance shall preclude this state from taxing, as other 
lands are taxed, any lands owned or held by any Indian who 
has severed his tribal relations, and has obtained from the 
United States or from any person, by patent or other grant, a 
title thereto, save and except such lands as have been or may 
be granted to any Indian or Indians under any act of Congress, 
containing a provision exempting the lands thus granted from 
taxation, which last mentioned lands shall be exempt from 
taxation so long, and to such extent, as is or may be provided 
in the act of Congress granting the same. \lU\ 
[Terr i tor ia l d e b t s a s s u m e d . ] 
Third: — All debts and liabilities of the Territory of Utah, 
incurred by authority of the Legislative Assembly thereof, are 
hereby assumed and shall be paid by this State. 1896 
[Free n o n s e c t a r i a n schools .] 
Fourth: — The Legislature shall make laws for the estab-
lishment and maintenance of a system of public schools, which 
shall be open to all the children of the State and be free from 
sectarian control. 1896 
ARTICLE IV 
ELECTIONS AND RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE 
Section 
1. [Equal political rights.] 
2. [Qualifications to vote.] 
3. [Voters — Immunity from arrest. 1 
4. [Voters — Immunity from militia duty.] 
5. [Voters to be citizens of United States.} 
6 [Mentally incompetent persons and certain criminals in-
eligible to vote.] 
7. [Property qualification forbidden.] 
8. [Ballot to be secret.] 
9. [General and special elections — Terms.] 
10. [Oath of office.] 
Sect ion 1. [Equal political r i gh t s . ] 
The rights of citizens of the State of Utah to vote and hold 
office shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex. Both 
male and female citizens of this State shall enjoy equally all 
civil, political and religious rights and privileges. ifi% 
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AMENDMENT I AMENDMENT VIII 
[Rel igious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to bear arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall 
not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT III 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, 
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a 
manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal act ions — Provis ions concerning — Due pro-
ces s of law and just compensat ion clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according 
to the rules of the common law. 
[Bail — Punishment . ] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
AMENDMENT IX 
[Rights retained by people . ] 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people. 
AMENDMENT X 
[Powers reserved to s tates or people.] 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people. 
AMENDMENTXI 
[Suits against s tates — Restrict ion of judic ia l power.] 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 
AMENDMENT XU 
[Election of Pres ident and Vice-President.] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states , and vote 
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at 
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with 
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted 
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as 
Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all per-
sons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists 
they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of 
the Government of the United States, directed to the Presi-
dent of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in the 
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all 
the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The 
person having the greatest number of votes for President, 
shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the 
whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have 
such majority, then from the persons having the highest 
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as 
President, the House of Representatives shall choose immedi-
ately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, 
the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from 
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall 
consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, 
and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. 
And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a 
President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon 
them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the 
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the 
death or other constitutional disability of the President.—The 
person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, 
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the 
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a 
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the 
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the 
purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of 
Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be 
necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible 
to the office of President shall be eligible to tha t of Vice-
President of the United States. 
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AMENDMENT XIII 
Section 
1. [Slavery prohibited.] 
2. [Power to enforce amendment . ] 
Section 1. [Slavery prohib i ted . ] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place 
subject to their jurisdiction. 
Sec, 2. [Power to en force a m e n d m e n t . ] 
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appro-
priate legislation. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.] 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confed-
eracy and claims not to be paid.] 
5. [Power to enforce amendment . ] 
Section 1. [Cit izenship — D u e proces s of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or natural ized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec, 2. [Representat ives — P o w e r to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States according to their respective numbers , counting the 
whole number of persons in each Sta te , excluding Indians not 
taxed. But when the right to vote a t any election for the choice 
of electors for President and Vice-President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judi-
cial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature 
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabi tants of such State, 
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in 
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein 
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such 
mals citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such Sta te . 
Sec, 3 . [Disqualif ication to h o l d office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, 
or Elector of President and Vice President , or hold any office, 
civil or military, under the Uni ted States , or under any State, 
who> having previously t aken an oath, as a member of Con-
gress, or as an officer of the United States , or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of 
any State, to support the Consti tut ion of the United States, 
shall have engaged in insurrect ion or rebellion against the 
same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But 
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove 
such disability. 
Sec s 4. [Public debt n o t t o b e q u e s t i o n e d — Debts of 
the Confederacy a n d c la ims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, autho-
rized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions 
and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebel-
lion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States 
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; 
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal 
and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment . ] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
AMENDMENT XV 
Section 
1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to disqualify] 
2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Right of c i t izens to vote — Race or color 
not to disqualify.] 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment . ] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation. 
AMENDMENT XVT 
[Income tax.] 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on 
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportion-
ment among the several States, and without regard to any 
census or enumeration. 
AMENDMENT XVII 
[Election of senators.] 
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two 
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six 
years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in 
each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors 
of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures. 
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State 
in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue 
writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the 
legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to 
make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacan-
cies by election as the legislature may direct. 
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the 
election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid 
as part of the Constitution. 
AMENDMENT XVIII 
[REPEALED DECEMBER 5, 1933. SEE AMENDMENT 
XXI, SECTION 1.] 
Section 
1. [National prohibition — Intoxicating liquors.] 
2. [Concurrent power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Time limit for adoption.] 
Section 1. [National prohibit ion — Intoxicat ing li-
quors.] 
After one year from the ratification of this article the 
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors 
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof 
ADDENDUM B 
9 5 1 5 0 1 0 8 4 3 - 2 5 - 9 6 
1 Q- M r . S p a i n h o w e r , do you h a v e t h e a b i l i t y t o 
2 c o u n t f r o m o n e t o s i x ? 
3 A. You b e t c h a . I g o t a h i g h s c h o o l d i p l o m a . 
4 I g o t a G . E . D . 
5 Q. Okay. Do you, at the present time, take 
6 any medication? 
7 A. I talked to my doctor today about what 
8 this town is doing to me, and he -- he thinks it's 
9 ridiculous. My doctors are on my side. 
10 Q. But I'm asking you do you take any 
11 medication at the present time? 
12 A. Yes, sir, I do. 
13 Q. And what is that medication for? 
14 A. Well, need I go in it? It's for my 
15 condition. 
16 J Q. What kind of condition do you suffer from? 
17 A. I'm -- (inaudible) -- disabled, sir. I'm 
18 -- (inaudible) -- disabled. That is confidential 
19 and 
20 Q. I ' m w o n d e r i n g i f y o u r d i s a b i l i t y 
2 1 r e n d e r s - -
22 MR. BARNES: Objection, Your Honor. Is 
23 this a competency hearing now that we're having in 
24 the court? 
25 THE COURT: How does it --
33 
951501084 3-25-96 
MR. BRICKEY: I'm just wondering if he has 
the ability to comprehend one through six or if we 
have a medication problem here, Your Honor. That's 
what I'm curious about. 
THE COURT: Okay. I can't convict him of 
anything if we do. Is that your concern? 
MR. BRICKEY: Yeah. I'm concerned that if 
we convict him after this we're going to have an 
issue on appeal about whether or not he's 
competent. If counsel will testify -- or stipulate 
at this point that the man is competent, then I 
suppose we can go forward. We have heard him allege 
to the fact that the town is after him or something 
to that effect. 
THE WITNESS: Well, I have doctors that 
will back me one hundred percent, sir, on my --
THE COURT: This is normally a defense 
motion, but the prosecution is making it. So you 
don't want a conviction in the case, you believe 
there should be a study into his mental capacity? 
MR. BRICKEY: Yes, Your Honor. At this 
point, the defendant --
THE COURT: I don't -- I don't have enough 
of a feel -- I have a question in the area, but I 
don't know have enough of a feel, haven't talked 
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1 with him, as Mr. Barnes probably has. Do you feel 
2 that there's a question the Court should address or 
3 not? 
4 MR. BARNES: Can we approach? 
5 THE COURT: Yeah, go ahead. 
6 MR. BARNES: Gary, why don't you have a 
7 seat down there. 
8 THE WITNESS: Sure. 
9 (Bench conference.) 
10 THE COURT: Let's go forward with the 
11 trial. And I'm going to sustain the objection on 
12 relevance as to the question of the witness. Do you 
13 want to come back up here, Gary, ar.d have a seat. 
14 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: You're already under oath. 
16 You can go ahead and have a seat. 
17 THE WITNESS: Okay. 
18 THE COURT: All right. Let me just state, 
19 if we were looking at -- this is a shoplifting 
20 case? Normally it would carry a fine. We're not 
21 looking at deprivation at liberty if there's a 
22 conviction, so I'm going to allow the case to go 
23 forward. 
24 MR. BRICKEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Any other questions? 
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MR. BRICKEY: None at this point. 
MR. BARNES: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: An redirect? Okay. You can 
step down. Any other witnesses? 
MR. BARNES: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. I don't think I 
require argument on this case. I find from the 
evidence that the defendant is guilty, taking too 
many refills. It's not a big case, but it's still a 
violation. Should we have sentencing today or at a 
later date, 2 to 30 days from now? 
MR. BRICKEY: The State is prepared to 
make recommendations, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: The standard fine would be 
$150. I would anticipate you may have some requests 
on no contact orders or something like that. 
MR. BRICKEY: Yes, Your Honor. Certainly 
we do . 
MR. BARNES: I would feel comfortable --
Gary, I'll take care of that. 
THE COURT: Do you want to have sentencing 
today or come back in a week? 
THE DEFENDANT: Can I explain something to 
you, Your Honor? 
MR. BARNES: No. 
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THE DEFENDANT: I'm on SSI, on limited 
funds. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BRICKEY: I would like to go ahead 
with that today, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. What do you 
request in the way of sentencing, and then I'll let 
the defendant --
MR. BRICKEY: Specifically, I would like 
the defendant to be ordered to stay away from the 
following individuals that testified: Norman 
Chandler, Kurt Gale, Henry Velasco, Sherry Reeves 
and though he was not present, Russell Grieder or 
Grieder, as well as Sheldon Barney. And I would 
also ask that the defendant be advised to not follow 
any members of the Fifth District Court or the Iron 
County Attorney's Office. 
THE COURT: All right. Standard fine of 
150 or are you requesting more than that? 
MR. BRICKEY: Standard fine of 150 would 
be appropriate, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Ma'am, who are 
you? 
VOICE: I'm his mother. 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead and have a 
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seat. We don't need your participation. 
VOICE: Well, there's a lot of lying going 
on, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Have a seat. I don't want you 
to get in contempt here. Okay. 
MR. BARNES: Your Honor, I concur with Mr. 
Brickey's recommendation with the exception of the 
fine. Mr. Spainhower is on disability. He does not 
earn very much money, and I would ask that the fine 
be reduced at least to half. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. BRICKEY: Just one moment, Your 
Honor. May I approach, counsel? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. BRICKEY: Your Honor, when Mr. 
Spainhower was booked into the Iron County 
Correctional Facility, he had $2,401 on his person. 
I have the booking slip receipt for that -- for that 
amount in question when he was booked. $150 is not 
that much compared to 2,401. 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, may I make a 
statement ? 
THE COURT: Go ahead and talk to your 
attorney for a minute, and then he'll be your 
spokesperson. 
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THE DEFENDANT: That's money my parents 
loaned me. Okay, sir? 
THE COURT: All right. Sentence is as 
follows: I'm going to suspend, you don't have to 
serve 90 days jail as long as you do probation 
adequately. You don't have to do any jail time. 
Fine of $75 to be paid on or before April 29th for 
review at 10:30 that day. 
The term of probation is to not follow or 
harass any of the -- let's put this in a formal 
sentence prepared by the county attorney's office 
and then list the names of the individuals that you 
stated employed at Wal-Mart and the court and county 
attorney personnel . 
MR. BRICKEY: Thank you. 
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, may I make a 
statement? 
THE COURT: We're done. That's the 
order. I've gone light on the fine because of your 
disability. Probably the most significant part is 
the order to stay away from people. 
MR. BARNES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE DEFENDANT: Could I get that in 
writing, sir? 
THE COURT: Yeah. We'll give you a 
ADDENDUM C 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT (IRON) 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF CEDAR CITY JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
VS (COMMITMENT) 
SPAINHOWER, GARY WAYNE CASE NO: 9515010& 
73 SOUTH 200 WEST DOB: 01/07/6# 
CEDAR CITY UT 84720 TAPE: 032596C^TNT: 01:46 
DATE: 03/25/9& 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR g'HE 
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS: 
Charge: 76-6-602 RETAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTING) 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty Plea 
Fine: 150.00 Susp: 75.00 
Jail: 0 DA Susp: 90 DA AC$: 0 
FEES AND ASSESSMENTS: 
Fine Description: Fine- Prosecutor Spl 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 0.00 Due: 55.56 
Fine Description: Surcharge - 35% 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 0.00 Due: 19.44 
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS: 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 0.00 Due: 75.00 
CALENDAR: 
NON JURY TRIAL 03/25/96 01:30 PM in rm 1 with RO^JRT T BRAITHWAITE 
REVIEW HEARING 04/29/96 10:30 AM in rm 1 with ROfi&RT "T BRAITHWAITE 
00023 
SPAINHOWER, GARY WAYNE CASE NO: 9515010JS PAGE 2 
DOCKET INFORMATION: 
Sentence: 
Deft present with Counsel, Prosecutor present 
ATD: BARNES, KEITH PRO: BURNS, SCOTT M 
Tape: 032596 Count: 01:46 
Judge: ROBERT T BRAITHWAITE 
Chrg: RETAIL THEFT Plea: Not Guilty Find: Gi|§lty Plea 
Fine Amount: 150.00 Suspended: 75.00 
Jail: 0 to 90 Suspended: 90 
REV scheduled for 04/29/96 at 103 0 A in room llwith RTB 
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE 
OF ENTRY OF THIS 
BY THE COURT 
DISTRICT COURT JH4^E/CJ0MMI S SI ONER 
30 DAYS 
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ADDENDUM D 
DAVID R. BRICKEY (#4283) 
Deputy Iron County Attorney 
91 North Main, Suite #2 
P.O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-6694 
Telecopier: (801) 586-2737 
5?n Judicial DIPTIC: i-'m-ir™ Counfv 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, STAY 
OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE, 
AND ORDER OF PROBATION 
Criminal No. 951501084 
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
The Defendant, GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER, having been found guilty of RETAIL 
THEFT, a Class B Misdemeanor, on March 25, 1996, and the Court having called the above-entitled 
matter on for sentencing on March 25, 1996, in Cedar City, Utah, and the above-named Defendant, 
GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER, having appeared before the Court in person together with his 
attorney of record, Keith C. Barnes, and the State of Utah having appeared by and through Deputy 
Iron County Attorney David R. Brickey, and the Court having reviewed the file in detail and 
thereafter having heard statements from the Defendant, his attorney, and the Deputy Iron County 
Attorney, and the Court being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters the following 
Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, and Order of Probation, to wit: 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, GARY 
WAYNE SPAINHOWER, has been convicted of the offense of RETAIL THEFT, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had anything to say in regard to 
why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or 
appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted. 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER, is hereby 
sentenced to a term of incarceration in the Iron County/Utah State Correctional Facility for a period 
of ninety (90) days. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER, pay a 
fine in the sum and amount of one thousand dollars ($1,000). 
STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the execution of the term of imprisonment imposed and the 
fine imposed in this case are hereby stayed, pending the Defendant's strict adherence to and 
compliance with the following terms and conditions of probation. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, GARY 
WAYNE SPAINHOWER, is hereby placed on probation for a period of twelve (12) months under 
the supervision of the Court (bench probation), strictly within the following terms, provisions, and 
conditions: 
1. Defendant shall commit no law violations during the period of this probation. 
-2-
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2. Defendant shall pay a fine in the amount of seventy-five dollars ($75). This matter 
shall be reviewed April 29, 1996, at 10:30 a.m. in the Fifth District Court, 40 North 100 East, Cedar 
City, Utah. 
3. Defendant shall not follow, intimidate, nor harass (1) Sherry Reeves, (2) Norman 
Chandler, (3) Kurt Gale, (4) Henry Velasco, (5) Russell T. Greider, (6) personnel of the Iron County 
Attorney's Office, and (7) members and personnel of the Fifth District Court. 
DATED this . — ^ day of March, 1996. 
: ~^'$r-M& • ROBERT T. BRAITHWAITE 
- , ' ->lFri==^['„ District Court Judge 
\ * » ' . ' • * • 
\ - . CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
I, LTNDA WILLIAMSON, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County, 
State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and exact copy of the original Judgment, 
Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, and Order of Probation in the case entitled State of Utah 
vs. Gary Wavne Spainhower. Criminal No. 951501084, now on file and of record in my office. 
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of Utah, 
Apfi 
this I S h day ofMafeh, 1996. 
V 
• * p S ^ T LINDA WILLIAMSON 
S s . District Court Clerk 
( S E A L ) V 0:>|if" 
v Deputy District Court Clerk 
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ADDENDUM E 
D. B r u c e O l i v e r # 5 1 2 0 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t 
180 S o u t h 300 Wes t , S u i t e 210 
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 84101-1218 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 3 2 8 - 8 8 8 8 
F a x : ( 8 0 1 ) 595-0300 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
: MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
Plaintiff, OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
vs. 
Case No. 951501084 
GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER, 
: Judge J . P h i l i p Eves 
D e f e n d a n t . 
Comes now t h e D e f e n d a n t , Gary Wayne Spa inhower , by and 
t h r o u g h c o u n s e l , D. B r u c e O l i v e r , and r e s p e c t f u l l y submi t s t h i s 
memorandum of p o i n t s a n d a u t h o r i t i e s i n o p p o s i t i o n t o c o n t i n u e d 
b e n c h p r o b a t i o n . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1 . For p u r p o s e s of t h i s m o t i o n Defendan t g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t s 
t h e f a c t s a s s e t o u t b y t h e p l a i n t i f f w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of t h e 
f o l l o w i n g p a r a g r a p h s : 1 , 3 , 6, 9 and 1 1 , which p a r a g r a p h s a r e 
f a c t u a l l y d i s p u t e d b y t h e d e f e n d a n t , i n whole o r i n p a r t . 
'C£": 
n n l O S 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is valid for either of 
two reasons. Attached herewith as Exhibit 1 is a copy of the 
judgment which was prepared by the Iron County Attorney's Office 
and submitted to the Court- This document was never served upon 
the defendant or his counsel. This document was never approved 
as to form or content. There is no certificate of mailing to 
anyone. The Order contains gratuitous language which was not 
ordered by the court. Attached herewith as Exhibit 2 are pages 
35-39 inclusive of the trial and sentencing of Mr. Spainhower. 
On page 38 of the transcript the defendant specifically requested 
that he receive a copy of the courts sentence in writing, the 
judge responded that the defendant would receive a copy of the 
order after Mr. Brickey typed it up. This never did occur, the 
defendant never did receive a copy of the order. 
The first point which would require a dismissal of this 
case is that the case was closed by Judge Braithwaite on April 
29, 1996. This is indicated in the Docket of this case which is 
attached as Exhibit 3. This argument was raised at the time of 
the hearing on the Order of Show Cause. Your Honor denied this 
Motion at that time; however, the transcript included herewith 
clarifies the facts of this issue. The Court on page 35 line 9 
states: "It's not a big case, but it's still a violation." The 
Judge set a review date in this matter of April 29, at 10:30 
a.m., that was the same date the fine of $75.00 was due. The 
fine was paid as ordered. The judge did not specify a 
probationary period. The period of 1 year was gratuitously added 
ex-parte by the County Attorney's Office when they prepared the 
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Order. The review date set by Judge Braithwaite and contained 
within the order was the time within which the court expected 
performance and was the date set to close the case. Judge 
Braithwaite routinely sets a review date in less important cases 
and upon the payment of the fines he closes the case. This case 
is neither unique nor unusual in that context. Judge Braithwaite 
closed this case as he would any other minor theft case under 
similar circumstances. Judge Braithwaite1 s closing of the case 
should not be summarily disregarded, when indeed it follows Judge 
Braithwaite's standard procedure. The addition of the 
probationary period by the County Attorney's Office should not 
prejudice Mr. Spainhower. Mr. Spainhower respectfully requests 
that this Court reconsider this portion of the Court's prior 
ruling. To allow this to go unchecked would be a clear violation 
of due process in this case. Mr. Spainhower was never adequately 
informed of what was expected of him. Mr. Spainhower was not 
given notice of the court's order. Further with the additions by 
the County Attorney's Office, there is significant confusion in 
the obligations of Mr. Spainhower. 
The second point for which this Order to Show Cause 
should be dismissed is that the time had run and that the 
defendant's probation had terminated by operation of law. Utah 
Code Annotated Section 77-18-1 (11) (b) provides: 
The running of the probation period is tolled upon 
the filing of a violation report with the court 
alleging a violation of the terms and conditions 
of probation or upon the issuance of an order to 
show cause or a warrant by the court. 
Id. This provision of the Code provides that there are two 
different situations which will toll the running of the 
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probationary period. These situations are 1) when there has been 
a violation report filed with the court; and 2) the issuance of 
an order to show cause or warrant of arrest by the court. The 
first situation is a document which is prepared and generated by 
Adult Parole and Probation as a result of their supervision of 
the probationer. Mr. Spainhower was not supervised by the 
Department of Adult Parole and Probation, nor did they file a 
violation report. The second method involves the issuance of an 
order to show cause or a warrant of arrest. These two documents 
are generated by either the court or the prosecutor's office. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-18-1 (12 (b) provides: 
(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging 
with particularity facts asserted to constitute 
violation of the conditions of probation, the 
court that authorized probation shall determine if 
the affidavit establishes probable cause to 
believe that revocation, modification, or 
extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable 
cause it shall cause to be served on the defendant 
a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause why his 
probation should not be revoked, modified, or 
extended. 
Id. This provision indicates that in order for the court to 
issue a warrant or order to show cause pursuant to this provision 
there must first be submitted an affidavit to the court. The 
code provisions require that the affidavit must allege facts with 
particularity. In this case there are only general allegations 
contained within the affidavit. Paragraph 4 (a) and (b) are the 
salient paragraphs and they are only general in nature. 
Paragraph 4 (b) of the affidavit of Terry Petersen contains names 
not specifically enumerated by Judge Braithwaite in court, they 
were requested by Mr. Brickey, however the judge did not 
4 
00103 
enumerate them. Judge Braithwaite told Mr. Brickey to include in 
his order the list of names and then to provide a copy of the 
order to Mr. Spainhower. The list of names was included however 
the list was never provided to Mr. Spainhower. 
The reference specifically to an affidavit in 
connection with an order to show cause or a warrant of arrest 
indicates that the filing of the affidavit is not comparable to 
the filing of a violation report. An affidavit is for the 
purpose of allowing the judge to determine from the detailed 
facts whether there is probable cause to determine whether or not 
an order to show cause should be issued. When this method is 
employed it is the issuance of the order to show cause which 
tolls the running of the probationary period. In the Affidavit 
of Terry Petersen he specifically requests that the court issue 
an order to show cause directing and requiring the defendant to 
appear before said court and show cause, if any he has, why the 
aforesaid period of probation should not be revoked. It is clear 
that this affidavit was specifically prepared and submitted in 
support of the issuance of an order to show cause. It is 
likewise interesting that along with this affidavit was also 
submitted a Bench Warrant and an Order to Show Cause. Under 
these circumstances it is the issuance of either of the Bench 
Warrant or the Order to Show Cause which tolls the running of 
probation. 
CONCLUSION 
The lack of notice of the alleged probation order, in spite 
of the court's direction that Mr. Spainhower be so advised and 
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provided a copy of the written order, violates Mr. Spainhowerfs 
rights to due process. This case was closed by Judge Braithwaite 
on April 29, 1996, in spite of the order prepared by the Iron 
County Attorney's Office. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (10)(a)(i) 
provides that the court in it's own discretion may terminate 
probation at any time. Judge Braithwaite did this and this court 
should recognize that decision by the judge and not tamper 
therewith. 
The filing of an affidavit is not the same as the 
filing of a violation report. The issuance of the bench warrant 
or the order to show cause by the court is what was required in 
this case to toll the running of the probationary period. There 
was no violation report filed with the court but rather an 
affidavit, the purpose of which was to have the court issue a 
warrant of arrest and or an order to show cause. 
Under either position as contained herein the Order to 
Show Cause should be dismissed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of 
July, 1997. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant 
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DAVID R. BRICKEY (#4283) 
Deputy Iron County Attorney 
97 North Main, Suite #1 
P.O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-6694 
Telecopier: (801) 586-2737 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, STAY 
OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE, 
AND ORDER OF PROBATION 
Criminal No 951501084 
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
The Defendant, GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER, having been found guilty of RETAIL 
THEFT, a Class B Misdemeanor, on March 25, 1996, and the Court having called the above-entitled 
matter on for sentencing on March 25, 1996, in Cedar City, Utah, and the above-named Defendant, 
GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER, having appeared before the Court in person together with his 
attorney of record, Keith C. Barnes, and the State of Utah having appeared by and through Deputy 
Iron County Attorney David R. Brickey, and the Court having reviewed the file in detail and 
thereafter having heard statements from the Defendant, his attorney, and the Deputy Iron County 
Attorney, and the Court being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters the following 
Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, and Order of Probation, to wit: 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, GARY 
WAYNE SPAINHOWER, has been convicted of the offense of RETAIL THEFT, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had anything to say in regard to 
why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or 
appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted. 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER, is hereby 
sentenced to a term of incarceration in the Iron County/Utah State Correctional Facility for a period 
of ninety (90) days. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER, pay a 
fine in the sum and amount of one thousand dollars ($1,000). 
STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the execution of the term of imprisonment imposed and the 
fine imposed in this case are hereby stayed, pending the Defendant's strict adherence to and 
compliance with the following terms and conditions of probation. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, GARY 
WAYNE SPAINHOWER, is hereby placed on probation for a period of twelve*(12) months under 
the supervision of the Court (bench probation), strictly within the following terms, provisions, and 
conditions: 
1. Defendant shall commit no law violations during the period of this probation. 
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2. Defendant shall pay a fine in the amount of seventy-five dollars ($75). This matter 
shall be reviewed April 29, 1996, at 10:30 a.m. in the Fifth District Court, 40 North 100 East, Cedar 
City, Utah. 
3. Defendant shall not follow, intimidate, nor harass (1) Sherry Reeves, (2) Norman 
Chandler, (3) Kurt Gale, (4) Henry Velasco, (5) Russell T. Greider, (6) personnel of the Iron County 
Attorney's Office, and (7) members and personnel of the Fifth District Court. 
DATED this ^#t^avfff3s4arck 1996 
VI t^m?Z¥L? 
ROBERT T. BRAITHWAITE 
$I&J '$ District Court Judge 
^ '^^: ./'CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
I, LINDA WILLIAMSON, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County, 
State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and exact copy of the original Judgment, 
Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, and Order of Probation in the case entitled State of Utah 
vs. Gary Wayne Spainhower, Criminal No. 951501084, now on file and of record in my office. 
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of Utah, 
Apri I 
this \Sh day of-MaFeh,.,lQ^:p^ 
/ f i t | l k UNDA WIH.IAMSON 
# ' . / / # p 8 ^ % \ *\ LINDA WILLIAMSON 
g * f :Sl|ffi|^ \ , sDistrict c ° u r t cierk 
~ ^;:y:*vr^*-;^ J; Deputy District Court Clerk 
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THE DEFENDANT: I'm on SSI, on limited 
funds. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BRICKEY: I would like to go ahead 
with that today, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. What do you 
request in the way of sentencing, and then I'll let 
the defendant --
MR. BRICKEY: Specifically, I would like 
the defendant to be ordered to stay away from the 
following individuals that testified: Norman 
Chandler, Kurt Gale, Henry Velasco, Sherry Reeves 
and though he was not present:, Russell Grieder or 
Grieder, as well as Sheldon Barney. And I would 
also ask that the defendant be advised to not follow 
any members of the Fifth District Court or the Iron 
County Attorney's Office. 
THE COURT: All right. Standard fine of 
150 or are you requesting more than that? 
MR. BRICKEY: Standard fine of 150 would 
be 
you 
app 
7 
ro P riate 
THE 
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COURT: 
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THE DEFENDANT: That's money my parents 
loaned me. Okay, sir? 
THE COURT: All right. Sentence is as 
follows: I'm going to suspend, you don't have to 
serve 90 days jail as long as you do probation 
adequately. You don't have to do any jail time. 
Fine of $75 to be paid on or before April 29th for 
review at 10:30 that day. 
The term of probation is to not follow or 
harass any of the -- let's put this in a formal 
sentence prepared by the county attorney's office 
and then list the names of the individuals that you 
stated employed at Wal-Mart and the court and county 
attorney personnel. 
MR. BRICKEY: Thank you. 
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, may I make a 
statement? 
THE COURT: We're done. That's the 
order. I've gone light on the fine because of your 
disability. Probably the most significant part is 
the order to stay away from people. 
MR. BARNES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE DEFENDANT: Could I get that in 
writing, sir? 
THE COURT: Yeah. We'll give you a 
00092 
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written copy of it after Mr. Brickey has typed it 
up . 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(Thereupon, the matter 
was concluded.) 
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FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-IRON CNTY COURT 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE CF UTAH v s . GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER 
CASE NUMEER 951501084 C i t y Misdemeanor J u n e 04 , 199? 
CHARGES 
Charge 1 - RETAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTING) - Class C Misdemeanor 
Plea: March 25, 1956 Not: Guilty 
Discosition: March 25, 1996 Guilty Plea 
PARTIES 
Plaintiff - STATS OF UTAH 
Represented by: SCOTT M. BURNS 
Represented by: DAVID R. ERICKEY 
Defendant - GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER 
73 SOUTH 2 00 WEST 
CEDAR CITY, UT 8 4720 
Represented by: D BRUCE OLIVER 
Payor - EASY DCES IT BAIL BONDS 
180 N 230 E #105 
ST GEORGE, UT 347 7 0 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
D e f e n d a n t Narre: GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER 
O f f e n s e t r a c k i n g n u m b e r : 6749355 
D a t e of B i r t h : J a n u a r y 0 7 , 1961 
S o c i a l S e c u r i t y Number : 
Law E n f o r c e m e n t A g e n c y : CEDAR CITY POLICE 
P r o s e c u t i n g A g e n c y : IRON COUNTY 
Agency C a s e Number : 
C i t a t i o n N u m b e r ; 10388 
A r r e s t D a t e : N o v e m b e r 1 5 , 1995 
v i o l a t i o n D a t e : November 1 5 , 1995 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Credit: 
Balance: 
PAPER BOND TOTALS Posted: 
Forfeited: 
Exonerated: 
Balance: 
145.00 
0.00 
75,00 
70.00 
300,00 
0.00 
300.00 
0.00 
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Case No: 951501034 
Date: Jun. 04, 1997 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: FINE 
Amount Due: 145.00 
Amount Paid: 0.00 
Amount Credit: 75.00 
Balance: 70.00 
NONMONETARY BOND DETAIL - TYPE: Surety 
Posted By: Easy Does It Bail Bonds 
Posted: 300.00 
Forfeited: 0.00 
Exonerated: 3 0 0.0 0 
Balance: 0,00 
CASE NOTE 
PROCEEDINGS 
11-24-95 Case Filed: 
11-24-95 Judge EVES assigned, cor^r. 
11-24-95 Arraignment schcdulea on November 2*, 1995 rt 02:00 PM in Roo^ 1 
ditn Judge BRAITHWAITE. cvi 
* * * ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE - ARRAIGNMENT 
HEARING 
11-2 4-95 ARR 11-24-95 0205P DEPENDANT PRESENT - DEFENDANT PLEADS NOT c<w 
11-24-95 GUILTY - TO BE SET FOR TRIAL ON FEBRUARY 12, 1995 0200P cwl 
11-24-95 Notice of Setting cwl 
11-24-95 Bench Trial scheduled on February 12, 1996 at 02:00 PM in Room 1 
with Judge BRAITHWAITE. cwl 
11-28-95 Bond Posted Non-Monetary Bond: 300.00 p%d 
Note: FILED: UNDERTAKING OF BAIL 
11-28-95 Bend Account created Total Due; J00.00 y\^ 
01-23-96 {Schedule Hearing/ scheduled on January 24, 1996 at 01:15 PM in 
Room 1 with Judge BRAITHWAITE. pki 
01-24-96 HRG: 012496 01:23 DEFENDANT IS PRESENT. J.RTB ASKS THE pKd 
01-24-96 DEFENDANT FINANCIAL QUESTIONS AND APPOINTS THE PUBLIC pkd 
01-24-96 DEFENDER. pkd 
01-24-96 **C.?KD PHONED KAREEN AT JIM PARK'S OFFICE AND NOTIFIED THEM pkd 
01-24-96 OF THE APPOINTMENT AND OF TRIAL DATE, KAREEN STATED NOT TO pkd 
Cl-24-96 SEND NOTICE ON THIS CASE. pxd 
02-20-96 FILED: INFORMATION pkd 
02-20-96 Notice of Setting laj 
02-21-96 ***DAVID BRiCKEY PHONED TODAY, STATED HE SENT A MOTION TO CONT. laj 
02-21-96 TO THE OFFICE ON FRIDAY. CLK LAJ INFORMED HIM SHE COULD NOT iaj 
02-21-96 FIND MOTION AND TO PLEASE FAX A COPY, HE STATED HE WOULD. laj 
02-21-96 Notice of Setting laj 
02-21-96 Bench Trial scheduled on March 25, 1996 at 01:30 PM in Room 1 
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Case No: 951501084 
Date: Jun . 04f 1997 
with Judge BRAITHWAITE. la: 
03-20-96 PILED: RETURN OF SERVICE AND SUBPOENA (RUSSELL T, GRIEDER) tac 
03-20-96 (KURT GALE) tac 
03-20-96 (HENRY VELASCO) tac 
03-20-96 (NORMAN CHANDLER) tac 
03-20-96 (SHERRY REEVES) tac 
03-21-96 FILED; RETURN OF SERVICE ON SUBPOENA (SHELDON BARNEY) pbr, 
03-25-96 Fine Account craated Total Due: 145.00 pbn 
03-25-96 TRL: 032596 01:46 DEFENDANT IS PRESENT. MR. BRICKEY AND pcH 
03-25-96 MR. BARNES ARE PRESENT. 1:43 MR. CHANDLER IS SWCRN AND pc. 
03-25-96 TESTIFIES. 1:52 MR. BARNES CRCSS EXAMINES THE WITNESS pel 
03-25-96 1:53 MR. BRICKEY RE-DIRECTS WITNESS. 1:54 SHERRY REEVES TAKESpdl 
03-25-96 THE STAND. 1:55 MR. BARNES CRCSS EXAMINE?. 2:00 HENRY pdl 
03-25-96 VELASCO TAKES THE STAND. 2:05 KURT GALE TAKES THE STAND pd-
03-25-9 6 2:08 MR. BARNES CROSS EXAMINES THE WITNESS. 2:09 SHELDON pdl 
03-2 5-9 6 3ARNEY TAKES THE STAND (ALL WITNESSES WERE S\<JC?^ BEFORE TRIAL pel 
03-25-96 BEGAN) 2:11 MR. BARNES CROSS EXAMINES WITNESS. 2:12 MR. pal 
03-25-96 SPAINHCWER IS SWORN AND TESTIFIES. 2:16 MR, BRICKEY CRCSS pdl 
03-25-56 EXAMINES THE WITNESS- J.RT3 SUSTAINS OBJECTION, CASE IS TO pdl 
0 3-2 5-9 6 GO FORWARD, J.RIB FINDS THE DEFENDANT GUILTY. J.RT3 ORDERS pd^ 
03-25-96 THE DEFENDANT $150.00 FINE, NO CONTACT ORDER. MR. BRICKEY pd^ 
03-25-96 GIVES RECOMMENDATIONS TO J.RT3, MR. BARNES CONCURS WITH MR. pd. 
03-2 5-9 6 BRICKEY WITH EXCEPTION TO THE FINE AMOUNT, pal 
03-25-96 J.RTB SUSPENDS 90 DAYS JAIL, 75.00 DOLLARS BY 4/29/96 5 10:30 pdl 
03-2 5-9 6 TERMS OF FR03ATION: DO NOT FOLLOW, HARASS WAL-MART, 5TH pd~ 
03-25-96 DISTRICT COURT, AND IRON COUNTY PERSONNEL. pal 
03-25-96 Sentence: pdl 
03-25-96 Review Hearing scheduled on April 29, 1996 at 10:20 AM in Rcorr 1 
with Judge BRAITHWAITE. " pdl 
03-25-96 Deft present with Counsel, Prosecutor present pal 
03-25-96 ATD: BARNES, KEITH PRO: 3URNS, SCOTT M pdl 
03-25-96 Tape: 032596 Count: 01:46 pdl 
03-25-96 Jldge: ROBERT T BRAITHWAITE pdl 
03-25-96 Chrg: RETAIL THEFT Pleat Not Guilty Find: Guilty Pleapdi 
03-25-96 Fine Amount: 150.00 Suspended: 75.00 pdl 
03-25-96 Jail: 0 to 90 Suspended: SO pdl 
03-25-96 Fines and assessments entered: FN 55.56 pdl 
03-25-96 SL 19.44 pdl 
03-25-96 Total fines and assessments .: 75.00 pdl 
03-25-96 REV scheduled for 04/29/95 at 1030 A in room 1 with RTBpdl 
03-27-96 Bond Exonerated -300.00 caw 
04-01-96 FILED; JUDGMENT, SENTENCE; STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE, AND tac 
04-01-96 ORDER OF PROBATION tac 
04-05-9 5 J.RTB AUTHORIZES COMMUNITY SERVICE. pbxti 
04-09-95 FILED; LETTER FROM DEFENDANT TO J.RTB pkd 
04-09-96 ***PER J.RTB: "AFPROVED-COMMUNITY SERVICE". pkd 
04-18-96 FILED; LETTER FROM LEGAL CENTER FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES tac 
04-18-96 REQUESTING A TRANSCRIPT FOR THE DEFENDANT WHO IS INDI- tac 
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Case No: 951501084 
Date: Jun. 04, 1997 
04-18-96 GENT. (JUDGE BRAITHWAITE ORDERS THE TRANSCRIFT TO BE tac 
04-13-96 ORDERED.) tac 
04-18-96 ***KAREN L. OWEN FROM THE LEGAL CENTER FOR PEOPLE WITH tac 
04-18-96 DISABILITIES REQUESTED THAT LAURIE WEB3 TRANSCRIBE tac 
04-18-96 THE HEARING tac 
04-18-9 6 DEFENDANT PHONED AND STATED HE IS WORKING ON COMMUNITY SERVICE Zd'« 
04-18-96 HOURS
 Cau 
04-22-9 6 FILED: COMMUNITY SERVICE REFERRAL (15 HOURS @ $5.00 PER HOUR tac 
04-22-96 FOR A TOTAL OF $75.00 CREDIT) tac 
04-24-96 Fine Payment Received: 0.0C tac 
Credit Received: 75,00 
Note: 15 HRS• @ $5/HR, = $75 CREDIT 
04-24-96 15 HRS. § $5/HR* - $75 CREDIT 
04-29-96 REVIEW HEARING: TAPE 042996 (1050) DEFENDANT NOT PRESENT, kcl 
04-2 9-9 6 FINS IS PAID IN FULL. CASE IS ORDERED CLOSED, ^pl 
04-29-96 Entered case disposition of: Closed <ci 
05-06-9 6 FILED; NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL AS COUNSEL (JAMES PARK) tkc 
05-13-96 ELIZABETH VANFLEET REQUESTED TAPE FROM C3-25-96 TO TRANSCRIBE cav. 
05-13-9 6 BACKUP TAPS MAILED TO ELIZZA3ETH VANFLEET ca>. 
Qo-20-96 FILED: TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 25, 1996 tac 
0 6-2 0-9 6 FILED: FAXED COPY OF LETTER MAILED TO ELIZABETH VAN FLEET FOR tac 
06-2 0-9 6 TRANSCRIPT PREPARATION. C.TAC COULD NOT LOCATE THE tac 
0 6-2 0-9 6 ORIGINAL LETTER SO ELIZABETH VAN FLEET FAXED A COPY OF tac 
06-2 0-9 6 THE LETTER THAT WAS MAILED TO HER WITH THE TAPS, A Z?xz 
06-20-96 COPY OF THIS FAXED LETTER WAS MAILED TO DAVID BRICKEY t«<~ 
06-20-96 FOR PAYMENT OF THE TRANSCRIPT. tac 
06-2 6-96 FILED: FAXED COPY OF LETTER FROM ELIZABETH VAN FLEET TO THE tac 
05-2 6-96 COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE WITH ATTACHED BILL FOR TRAN- tac 
06-26-96 SCRIPT tac 
07-18-96 JUDGE BRAITHWAITE TALKED WITH C.TAC REGARDING THIS CASE AND tac 
07-18-96 THE TRANSCRIPT, JUDGE WANTS THIS CASE SCHEDULED FOR A tac 
07-18-96 HEARING ON JULY 30, 1996 AT 1:30 P.M. tac 
07-13-96 Notice of Setting tec 
07-25-95 ELIZABETH VANFLEET PHONED AND STATED THE STATE OF UTAH HAS caw 
07-25-9 6 ALREADY PAID HER FOR THE TRANSCRIPT SHE PREPARED caw 
07-26-96 {Schedule Hearing} scheduled on July 30, 1996 at 01:32 PM in 
Room 1 with Judge BRAITHWAITE• laj 
07-30-96 HRG: 144PM- THE DEFENDANT AND ATP DAVID BRICKEY ARE PRESENT. I3I 
07-30-96 THE COURT AUTHORIZES TWO COPIES MADE OF THE TRANSCRIPT, ONE ljl 
07-30-96 TO BE SENT TO THE DEFENDANT THE OTHER TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY,ljl 
07-30-96 FILED: LETTER FROM KAREN OWEN REQUESTING A TRANSCRIPT ON THE 1^1 
07-30-96 BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT 1^1 
07-30-96 FILED; UTAH RULE 77-32-5 111 
07-31-96 ***COPIES OF THE TRANSCRIPT MAILED TO DAVID BRICKEY AND THE la} 
07-31-96 DEFENDANT ON THIS DATE laj 
03-21-97 FILED? STATE'S MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND BENCH WARRANTpkd 
03-21-97 FILED: AFFIDAVIT OF TERRY PETERSEN okd 
03-21-97 REC'D: BENCH WARRANT bkd 
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Case Nc: 951501084 
Date: Jun. 04, 1997 
03-21-97 REC'D: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE pKd 
03-25-97 FILED: ORDER OF RECUSAL (SIGNED J.RTB 3/25/97) pkd 
03-25-97 **P£R J.RTB: SEND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND BENCH WARRANT TO pkd 
03-25-97 J.JPE pkd 
04-01-97 Order to Show Cause scheduled on May 06, 1997 at 01:30 ?M m 
DISTRICT COURT with Judge EVES. mem 
04-03-97 Warrant ordered on: April 03, 1997 Warrant: Num: 97C000245 Bail 
Allowed 
Bail amount: 1000,00 
04-03-97 Warrant issued on: April 03, 1997 Warrant Num: 970000245 Bail 
Allowed 
Bail amount: 1000.00 
Judge: J. PKILI? EVES 
Issue reason: The defendant: failed to comply with the terms 
of probations as alleged in the Order to Shew Cause. 
04-03-97 Case disposition removed tac 
04-03-97 Added WARRANT FEE to charge list. tac 
04-03-97 THE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE WILL BE SUBMITTING A NEW ORDER TO tac 
04-03-97 SHOW CAUSE tac 
04-03-97 ISSUED: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (SIGNED BY J.J?E ON 4-1-97) ZuC 
04-09-97 FILED: APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL, ENTRY OF NOT GUILTY PLEA, DEMAND ta<-
04-09-97 FOR JURY TRIAL tac 
04-09-97 FILED: REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY tac 
OV-09-97 FILED: REQUEST FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS tac 
04-15-97 Filed: Return of Service on Order to Show Cause {Gary 
Spainhower) ci:.dy: 
05-05-97 Filed: STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCCVZRi cir.dyr 
05-05-97 Order to Show Cause scheduled on May 06, 1997 at 01:30 PM in 
DISTRICT COURT With Judge EVES. maxmer: 
05-05-97 Order to Shew Cause Cancelled scheduled for: 5/5/97 
05-06-97 Minute Entry - Minutes for Order to Show Cause maxirej 
PRESENT 
Prosecutor: DAVID R. 3RICKSY 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): D BRUCE OLIVER 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 7, 1961 
Video __ 
Tape Number: 97035 Tape Count: 2:05pm 
Clerk: maxinem 
CHARGES 
1. RETAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTING) - Class C Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/25/1996 Guilty Plea 
HEARING 
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Case No: 951501084 
Date: Jun. 04, 1997 
The defendant is advised of the charges, the possible penalties, 
and his rights. 
Mr. Spainhower denies the allegations contained in the Affidavit 
for Order to Show Cause, 
Tms matter is set for an evidentiary hearing on either June 6, 
199"\ at 1:30 p.m. or June 10, 1997, at 1:30 p.m. Mr. Oliver will 
contact tie Court within two days to indicate which day ne prefers. 
05-06-97 Warrant recalled on: May 06, 1997 Warrant nam: 970000245 
Recall reason: Warrant recalled because defendant was 
bocKed. 
05-13-97 Order to Show Cause scheduled on June 10, 1997 at 09:00 AM in 
DISTRICT COURT with Judge EVES. maxiner, 
Order to Show Cause ~ Evidentiary Hearing 
05-27-97 Notice - NOTICE for Case 951501084 ID 5952 ipaxinem 
Evidentiary Hearing is scheduled. 
Date: 06/10/1997 
Tine: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: DISTRICT COURT 
IRON COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
68 SOUTH 100 EAST 
PAROWAN, UT 847 61 
Order to Show Cause - Evidentiary Hearing 
05-27-97 Evidentiary Hearing scheduled on June 10, 1997 at 09:00 AM in 
PISTRICT COURT with Judge EVES, rwaxin«r 
05-27-97 Evidentiary Hearing Cancelled scheduled for: 6/10/97 
Notice did not print 
00384 
Page 6 (last) 
ADDENDUM F 
DAVID R. BRICKEY - USB #6188 
Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney 
97 North Main, Suite #1 
P.O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-6694 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER, 
) STATE'S MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING 
THE DEFENDANT'S CONTINUED 
) BENCH PROBATION 
Criminal No. 951501084 
Defendant. Judge J. Philip Eves 
COMES NOW the State of Utah, by and through Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney David 
R. Brickey, and respectfully submits a Memorandum Supporting The Defendant's Continued Bench 
Probation. The State of Utah asserts that the Defendant's bench probationary period should continue 
based on current State Statute, Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-1 (11) (b) and on the basis of State v. 
Green. 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988) and State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063 (Utah App. 1995). 
FACTS 
(1) On or about November 15, 1995, in Iron County, State of Utah, the Defendant 
concealed or transferred or caused to be carried away merchandise at Wal-Mart, in Cedar City. Utah. 
(2) On March 25,1996. the Defendant and his court appointed counsel appeared before 
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite and a trial was conducted. 
00381 
(3) As a result of the above referenced trial the Defendant was found guilty of Retail 
Theft, a Class B Misdemeanor. Defendant was sentenced to ninety (90) days jail and fined $1,000. 
The Court stayed his sentence and placed him on a one (1) year term of bench probation. The terms 
of probation were as follows: pay a $75.00 fine by April 29, 1996, and a requirement that the 
Defendant not harass, intimidate, threaten, or provoke a particular witness, Ms. Sherri Reeves. 
(4) On or about March 26, 1996, Judge Robert T. Braithwaite signed and executed a 
Judgement, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, and Order of Probation based on the above 
conviction. 
(5) On or about April 1, 1996, the District Court Clerk by and through Deputy District 
Court Clerk, Tamara A. Carter, entered the above listed Judgement, Sentence, Stay of Execution of 
Sentence, and Order of Probation. 
(6) On or about February 28, 1997, the State of Utah alleges that Gary Wayne 
Spainhower approached Ms. Sherri Reeves and did make threatening comments to her in violation 
of his bench probation. 
(7) On or about March 21, 1997, the State of Utah through the Iron County Attorneys 
Office prepared a State's Motion for Order to Show Cause and Bench Warrant and provided the 
same to Fifth District Court Judge Robert T. Braithwaite. Attached to the State's Motion for Order 
to Show Cause and Bench Warrant was an Affidavit signed by Cedar City Police Sergeant Terry 
Petersen, also dated March 21, 1997. 
(8) On or about March 25, 1997, Judge Robert T. Braithwaite executed an Order of 
Recusal on the above matter and assigned it to Judge J. Philip Eves for further proceedings. 
(9) On or about March 25, 1997, Judge J. Philip Eves executed a Bench Warrant in the 
- 2 -
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amount of $1,000.00. 
(10) On or about March 26, 1997, the Iron County Attorneys Office was contacted by 
Judge J. Philip Eves Clerk, Maxine Munson, and requested that a new "Order to Show Cause" 
Pleading be prepared showing a Parowan address and Judge J. Philip Eves name for future hearings. 
(11) On or about April 1, 1997, Judge J. Philip Eves executed and signed an Order to 
Show Cause indicating Defendant should appear for an initial arraignment on May 6, 1997, at 1:30 
p.m., in Parowan, Utah. 
(12) On May 6, 1997, in Parowan, Utah, the Defendant appeared with counsel and denied 
the allegations set forth in the affidavit signed by Sergeant Terry Petersen and requested an 
Evidentiary Hearing. An Evidentiary Hearing date was set for June 10, 1997. (This allowed the 
Defendant Thirty-five (35) days to prepare for the hearing.) 
(13) On June 10, 1997, the State of Utah appeared, along with the Defendant and his 
counsel in Parowan, Utah, and an Evidentiary Hearing was conducted. The State of Utah presented 
evidence through the form of witness Sherri Reeves as to the allegations of events that occurred on 
February 28,1997. At the conclusion of the State's evidence the Defendant's attorney requested a 
dismissal of the matter claiming that jurisdiction over his client had lapsed. The State of Utah 
requested at that time an opportunity to prepare a Memorandum supporting the position that 
probation should continue. The Court imposed a deadline of July 1, 1997, for the State to prepare 
a Memorandum supporting that position, and the Defendant's response is expected by July 11,1997. 
LAW AND ARGUMENT 
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ISSUE 
Whether Defendant's bench probationary period can be extended 
beyond March 24, 1997? Stated another way, did the State properly 
initiate revocation proceedings prior to the Defendant's probationary 
period expiring? 
The State of Utah asserts that the Fifth District Court has the authority to extend the 
Defendant's probation because the filing of the State's Order to Show Cause on March 21, 1997, is 
in accordance with the provisions of UCA § 77-18-1(1 l)(b), and in particular, because the Defendant 
was given proper notice of the hearing. Defendant argues that State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063, 
stands for the proposition that his probation has expired and thus the court has lost the authority to 
extend his probationary period beyond March 24, 1997. 
The State of Utah asserts that the issues raised in State v. Rawlings are different and 
distinguishable from those that are raised in State of Utah v. Gary Wayne Spainhower. Specifically, 
in the matter of Rawlings. the Court stated that "even though revocation proceedings were 
commenced well before the expiration of probation, because the plaintiff was not given notice of the 
revocation proceedings before the probation period expired, the Court held that the trial Court lacked 
the authority to revoke the [Defendant's] probation and his petition for Habeas Corpus was granted." 
Id. at 1068 (quoting Smith v. Cook. 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990)). In Rawlings. the Utah Court of 
Appeals ruled that a trial Court may retain jurisdiction over a probationer after the probation period 
expires for the purposes of extension proceedings if the proceedings are properly initiated before the 
probation expires. State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063, 1071. Additionally, the Rawlings decision 
requires that the probationer be given "proper notice." Quoting from the ruling, "proper notice" 
means, "informing a probationer of the issues which will be addressed at the extension hearing and 
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giving the probationer adequate time to address them". Id 
In Rawlings. the Defendant was not given proper notice of the probation extension hearing 
before the probation period expired and a subsequent meeting with the trial Judge did not constitute 
a knowing waiver of this due process right, therefore, the trial court lacked the authority necessary 
to extend Defendant's probation and the Defendant's previous extensions were terminated and his 
probation expired. Id. 
Judge Moylin, wrote in State of Maryland v. Jerrv L. Wilson. 664 A.2d 1, the use of 
arguments based on legal authority derived from just use of key notes can be very precarious. Judge 
Moylin states that using parts and bits of previous cases to establish stare decisis is not sound juris 
prudence. Rather Judge Moylin believes that"... a looking at the entirety of the ruling must be made 
so that the standing of the Court intended is followed." Id. at . Specifically, Judge Moylin wrote: 
In looking to the case law as a source of legal authority, there seems 
to be an almost epidemic trend among lawyers generally—civil and 
criminal, on the prosecution side and on the defense side of the trial 
table alike, and even among some Judges-to forget the most 
elemental ABC's first-semester, first-year Legal Method. Everything 
said by a Judge or by a Court is not of equal weight. Were the three 
cases that we are about to examine offering us three thoroughly 
considered holdings, their authority would stand on undeniable 
bedrock. Were they three well considered, well researched, and well 
analyzed instances of even deliberate and conscious dicta, they would 
still be standing on firm, persuasive ground. If, on further 
examination, however, they turn out to be no more than three 
careless, casual, and passing instances of the most obiter of dicta, 
they should represent no more to us than the glib blandishments of a 
snake oil salesman, no matter who wrote them. 
The State of Utah sites Judge Moylin's reference for the purposes of pointing out that the 
decision reached in State v. Rawlings was based on case law that was present and pertinent to the 
facts of 1985. The facts that are relevant and pertinent to Mr. Spainhower are as follows. In 1989, 
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during the general session of the Utah Legislature, a new portion to UCA § 77-18-1 was entered and 
passed into law. 
Specifically, the paragraph that appears as UCA § 77-18-1 (ll)(b): stating, 'The running 
of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation report with the court alleging a 
violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or 
a warrant by the court." Applying such language and it's plain meaning to the facts at hand 
establishes that the State of Utah filed a probationary violation report with the Court alleging a 
violation of the terms and conditions of the Defendant's probation prior to March 24, 1997. 
Specifically, the Iron County Attorney's Office filed said violation report on March 21, 1997. 
By filing the probationary violation report of March 21,1997, the State of Utah may now rely 
on UCA § 77-18-1 (1 l)(b) as a basis for tolling Mr. Spainhower's probation and justifies an 
extension if the court finds that the Defendant did violate the terms of his probation. 
Of historical significance is the footnote that appears in State v. Green. 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 
1988). In Green the Utah Supreme Court is asked to consider the extension of a Defendant's 
probation. The Court points out that it's decision does not specifically consider whether "...the 
revocation proceedings in this case were not initiated until after the statutory probation term had 
expired, we need no reach the issued of the retention of jurisdiction when proceedings have been 
initiated but not completed within the eighteen-month term." Id at 465, fh 3. Within a year of the 
Green decision, the Utah legislature enacted UCA § 77-18-1 (1 l)(b). [Originally enumerated as 
UCA § 77-18-1 (8)(b).] The effect of UCA § 77-18-1 (1 l)(b) addresses specifically the question the 
court raise in Green at footnote 3. 
Finally, the state can further rely on the fact that a Warrant of Arrest was signed on March 
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25, 1997, by Judge J. Philip Eves. This warrant is issued on the last day of the Defendant's one year 
probation based on the original execution date of the Judgement, Sentence, Stay of Execution of 
Sentence and Order of Probation. Judge Robert T. Braithwaite signed that Judgement on March 26, 
1996, and upon it's entering on April 1, 1996, the Judgement date was set. Therefore, the State 
would argue that the signing of the Warrant of Arrest complies with the final means of tolling the 
Defendant's probation as set forth in UCA § 77-18-1 (1 l)(b). 
Further distinguishable from Rawlings is the fact that Mr. Spainhower, unlike Mr. 
Rawlings, was provided proper notice and given adequate time to address the issues of his alleged 
probation violation. In the case before the Bar, Mr. Spainhower and counsel were notified well in 
advance of the Evidentiary Hearing conducted on June 10, 1997. Specifically, Defendant and his 
attorney were given notice on May 6, 1997, of the upcoming Evidentiary Hearing and the nature of 
the content of the Affidavit signed by Sergeant Terry Peterson. Additionally, Mr. Spainhower was 
served with the Order to Show Cause on April 11, 1997. Thus, the Defendant was afforded more 
than sixty (60) days to prepare for his hearing on June 10, 1997. 
Referring to the analysis of Judge Moylin once again, the State asserts that the holding of 
State v. Rawlings is not that the Defendant must receive notice of the probation extension hearing 
before the probationary period expires, rather, that the Defendant must be given "proper notice" 
before the hearing itself. "Proper notice" having been established as informing the probationer of 
the issues which will be addressed at the extension hearing and giving the probationer adequate time 
to address them. Id at 1071. The Defendant did have, under UCA § 77-18-1 (ll)(b) a properly 
initiated probation extension proceeding and was given "proper notice" as required by Rawlings. 
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CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, the State of Utah respectfully requests that this Court deny the Defendant's 
request to terminate his bench probation. The State of Utah believes that this is an appropriate result 
based on UCA § 77-18-1 (1 l)(b) and the State's filing a probation violation report prior to March 
24, 1997. The final basis of the State's position is that the Defendant and his attorney were given 
proper, ample and adequate notice for the Evidentiary Hearing that followed on June 10, 1997, in 
accordance with Rawlings. 
DATED this 3 ^ d a y of June, 1997. 
DAVID R. BRICKEY 
Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed and faxed a full, true, and correct copy of the within and 
foregoing STATE'S MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING DEFENDANT'S CONTINUED BENCH 
PROBATION by first class mail, this day of June, 1997, to the following, to wit: 
Mr. D. Bruce Oliver 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1218 
FAX: (801) 595-0300 
yjfainttc )f. (JULiaJry, 
Secretary 
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ADDENDUMG 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 951501084 MO 
5th JUDICIAL DIST C0URT IC><> X>- n "• 
[7 w w? w J£~£ Jfcj 1 -
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This matter came before the Court on August 4, 1997, for oral argument on 
ULERK 
DEPUTv 
defendant's pending Motion to Dismiss. The Court heard argument and took the matter under 
submission. Having now reviewed the file in its entirety, including the memoranda filed by 
the parties, the Court now denies the Motion to Dismiss. 
In this case the defendant was charged by the State of Utah with the offense of retail 
theft, a class B misdemeanor on February 20, 1996. On March 25, 1996, the case was tried 
before the Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite, District Judge. The defendant was adjudged 
guilty, and on April 1, 1996, Judge Braithwaite executed a Judgment, Sentence, Stay of 
Execution of Sentence, and Order of Probation. The third numbered paragraph of that 
document contains the following language: 
"Defendant shall not follow, intimidate, nor harass (1) Sherry Reeves, . . . " 
Thereafter on March 21, 1997, the State of Utah filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause and 
Bench Warrant alleging that Mr. Spainhower had violated his probation by commiting the 
^ 
ii 
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criminal offense of Retailiation Against a Witness, a third-degree felony by contacting and 
intimidating Sherry Reeves. The Order to Show Cause was issued and the matter was set for 
appearance before the Court on the 6th of May 1997. Thereafter D. Bruce Oliver appeared as 
attorney for defendant and entered a plea of not guilty and demanded a jury trial. On May 6, 
1997, the matter came before the Court and was set for an evidentiary hearing. The matter 
next came before the Court on June 10, 1997, for an evidentiary hearing. At that hearing Mr. 
Oliver made a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the case had been closed by Judge Braithwaite 
on April 29, 1996, and secondly that the probation had terminated before the Order to Show 
Cause and Bench Warrant in this case were signed. 
The matter was then set for further briefing and on June 30, 1997, the State filed its 
Memorandum supporting its argument that the matter should not be dismissed. On July 14, 
1997, the defendant filed a Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Dismiss. Oral argument 
on the matter was heard on August 4, 1997. 
Defendant raises two points in support of the Motion to Dismiss. First the defendant 
argues that the docket in this case indicates that Judge Braithwaite terminated the defendant's 
probation by closing the case. 
The Court has reviewed the docket. The facts are not in material dispute. Apparently 
at the time Judge Braithwaite entered his judgment in the case and placed the defendant on 
probation, he stated that the probation was to continue for one year from March 25, 1996. In 
the same document Judge Braithwaite scheduled the matter of the $75 fine in this case for 
review on April 29, 1996, at 10:30 a.m. 
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The docket reflects that upon review of the fme payment the Court noted that the fine 
had been paid and the clerk entered a statement upon the docket that the case was closed. 
However no order was entered that probation was terminated or that the other provisions of 
probation were not to continue in full force and effect for the term established in the probation 
order. 
The defendant is the moving party in this case and has the burden or establishing that 
his motion is well taken. The defendant has failed to demonstrate that Judge Braithwaite 
intended to revoke the probation order previously entered in this case or to terminate the 
probation before it had run its course. The defendant has further failed to demonstrate that the 
note placed in the docket by the court clerk in any way reflects a determination by the Court to 
terminate the probation. Accordingly the Motion to Dismiss on that ground is denied. 
The defendant also alleges as a ground for his Motion to Dismiss that the probation in 
this case terminated by operation of law before the Court issued its Order to Show Cause and 
Warrant in this matter. In support of his position the defendant cites the provisions of 77-18-
1. The defendant argues that since this was not formal probation supervised by Adult 
Probation and Parole the probation period would not have been tolled by the filing of the 
State's Motion for Issuance of Order to Show Cause and Bench Warrant on March 21, 1996, 
but would have only been tolled once the Order to Show Cause and Bench Warrant were 
actually issued by the Court. 
The Court disagrees with the defendant's reading of the statute. Section 77-18-1(1 l)(b) 
specifically provides: 
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"The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of 
a violation report with the Court alleging a violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an Order to Show Cause 
or a Warrant by the Court." 
In this case there was filed on March 21, 1997, a violation report consisting of a 
Motion by the County Attorney's Office for an order to show cause and bench warrant 
supported by an Affidavit signed by a law enforcement officer and alleging that the defendant 
had violated the specific provisions of his probation by commiting a new crime and by 
violating a restraining provision designed to protect witnesses and other personnel specifically 
named in the probation order. 
Under the provisions of the statute once the Court received notification of the alleged 
violation of probation, the running of Mr. Spainhower's probation term was tolled under the 
specific provisions of the statute. 
The provisions of this statute tolling the running of the probation period should not be 
confused with the provisions of the statute or the holding of State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2nd 
1063, relating to the failure to give the defendant notice when the State seeks to extend a 
probation period. Extending probation and tolling the running of the probation period are not 
the same. In order to extend a probation period the defendant must be given notice of the 
proceedings or must waive notice. Otherwise the probation period continues as originally set. 
On the other hand the filing of a violation notice with the Court, whether it comes from 
Adult Probation and Parole or the County Attorney, tolls or stops the running of the probation 
period. That occurred in this case on March 21st which was within the one year of probation 
50113 
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established by the sentencing judge. The defendant's Motion to Dismiss on that ground is 
likewise denied. 
The County Attorney will prepare and submit for the Court's signature an order 
reflecting the provisions of this Memorandum Opinion. 
DATED this 21st day of August 1997. 
g^s-t**— 
J. PHILIP EVES, District Court Judge 
ADDENDUMH 
DAVE) R. BRICKEY - USB #6188 
Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney 
97 North Main, Suite #1 
P.O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (435) 586-6694 
Telecopier: (435) 586-2737 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT , IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH. ; 
Plaintiff. ; 
vs. ] 
GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER, ; 
Defendant. 
) ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, 
) ORDER REVOKING PROBATION. 
EXECUTION OF SENTENCE, AND 
) COMMITMENT 
) Criminal No. 951501084 
) Judge J. Philip Eves 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court on November 17, 1997, pursuant 
to an order to show cause as to why Defendant's probation should not be revoked, and the State of 
Utah having appeared by and through David R. Brickey, Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney, and 
the Defendant GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER, having appeared in person together with his 
counsel of record, Bruce Oliver, and the Court first inquiring as to whether or not the Defendant's 
Motion for Reconsideration would be considered, and the Court having taken into consideration the 
Defendant's Memorandum of Points of Authorities Supporting Reconsideration and then reviewing 
the State's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, and the Court 
thereafter deciding to deny the Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, and calling the matter on 
FILED 
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for disposition based on the evidentiary hearing held on June 10, 1997, and finding by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant violated the terms and conditions of his probation 
by contacting Sherry Reeves, and the Court having thereafter heard statements from the Defendant, 
his attorney, and the Deputy Iron County Attorney, and having been fully advised in the premises, 
the Court now makes and enters the following orders, to wit: 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant's Motion 
for Reconsideration is hereby denied. 
ORDER REVOKING PROBATION 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant's probation 
should be and hereby is revoked. 
EXECUTION OF SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the previous execution of sentence that was stayed is hereby 
reinstated with the following modifications, the Defendant shall serve a term of incarceration in the 
Iron County Correctional Facility, allow housing at the Utah State Prison while serving a diagnostic 
evaluation in relation to criminal no. 971500209, for a term of sixty (60) days. 
COMMITMENT 
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH: 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, GARY WAYNE 
SPAINHOWER, and deliver him to the Iron County/Utah State Correctional Facility, there to be 
held under the provisions of the foregoing Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, 
Order Revoking Probation, Execution of Sentence, and Commitment. 
00i 
DATED this ^ / ^ d a y of November, 1997. 
J.^HILIP EVES (/ 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
I, CAROLYN BULLOCH, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County, 
State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and exact copy of the original Order 
Denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, Order Revoking Probation, Execution of 
Sentence, and Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs. Gary Wayne Spainhower. Criminal 
No. 951501084, now on file and of record in my office. 
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of Utah, 
this c-^-! day of November. 1997. ,
 m «„, s« « .•/»* 
CAROLYN BULLOCH 
District Court Clerk 
( S E A L ) 
/J//((i/;^Ak-h By: '- <-/l--A'-! v\ 
Deputy D|strict Court Clerk 
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D. Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorney for Defendant 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1218 
Telephone: (801) 328-8888 
Fax: (801) 595-0300 /Vyy^ O---
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY WAYNE SPA1NHOWER, 
Defendant, 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING 
MOTION TO REDUCE CHARGE 
Case No. 971500209FS 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
Comes now the Defendant, Gary Wayne Spainhower, by and 
through counsel, D. Bruce Oliver, and pursuant to Rule 4-501, 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, hereby submits this 
memorandum of points and authorities supporting his motion to 
reduce charge. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are based on the statements made 
within the Information, the police reports and supplemental 
reports prepared by the officers involved which are filed with 
this Court, the evidence and testimony of the victim taken from 
case no. 951501084, and any logical inferences drawn therefrom. 
These facts are for the purpose of demonstrating a legal theory 
and the Defendant does not concede to these facts or this factual 
scenario nor does he admit any guilt expressed or implied. 
1. The Defendant (hereinafter "Mr. Spainhower") has been 
charged by information with RETALIATION AGAINST WITNESS, a Third 
Degree Felony in violation of Title 76, Chapter 8, Section 508, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
2. On or about February 28, 1997, Mr. Spainhower 
approached and confronted the victim in the store and told her, 
"I'm going to get you for lying in Court you fat bitch." 
3. This communication was received and recorded as a 
threat to commit a serious bodily injury to herself or a member 
of her immediate family. 
4. Then Mr. Spainhower continued to follow her about the 
store at which point she became concerned for her safety left her 
groceries and proceeded directly out to her car. 
5. The victim noticed that Mr. Spainhower continued to 
follow her out in the parking lot and even exited out the same 
parking lot as she used. 
6. The victim indicated that Mr. Spainhower!s use of the 
same parking lot exit caused her to become fearful of bodily 
injury to herself or to a member of her immediate family. 
7. Mr. Spainhower caused the victim to suffer emotional 
distress or a member of her immediate family to suffer emotional 
distress. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE CHARGE SHOULD BE REDUCED TO STALKING OR HARASSMENT. 
2 
A. Introduction. 
STALKING, Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-106.5 (1953, as 
amended), is, inter alia, a Class B Misdemeanor when: 
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of 
conduct directed at a specific person that would cause 
a reasonable person: 
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member 
of his immediate family; or 
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a 
member of his immediate family; 
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the 
specific person: 
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily 
injury to himself or a member of his family; or 
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member 
of his immediate family will suffer emotional 
distress; and 
(c) whose conduct; 
(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily 
injury to himself or a member of his immediate 
family; or 
(ii) cause emotional distress in the specific 
person or a member of his immediate family. 
Id. 
HARASSMENT, Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-106 (1953, as 
amended), is a Class B Misdemeanor when: 
[The actor], with intent to frighten or harass another, 
he communicates a written or recorded threat to commit 
any violent felony. 
Id. 
B. Grounds. 
The Grounds for t h i s motion i s tha t Mr. Spainhower i s 
e n t i t l e d to the benef i t of the lessor penalty when cer ta in 
conduct i s prohibi ted by d i f f e r e n t or conf l ic t ing s t a t u t e s . 
C. Case Law—State v . Shondel . 
A defendant is entitled to be charged under a statute 
carrying the lesser penalty. State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 
(Utah 1969). In Shondel, the Supreme Court agreed with the 
3 
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proposition advocated by the defendant "that the equal protection 
of the laws requires that they affect alike all persons similarly 
situated-" Id- Consistently, the Court reasoned: 
[WJhere there is doubt or uncertainty as to which of 
two punishments is applicable to an offense an accused 
is entitled to the benefit of the lesser. This impels 
the conclusion here that the clear, specific and lesser 
penalty prescribed for the offense as a misdemeanor . . 
. is the one which should be imposed. We say this 
mindful of our statute which provides that the 
common-law rule of strict construction of statutes is 
not applicable in this state. But it is our opinion 
the conclusion we have reached is in harmony with that 
section's further mandate that our statutes should be 
"construed according to the fair import of their terms 
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and 
to promote justice." 
Id. As a result the Shondel Court found the wrong sentence had 
been imposed and remanded the matter back to the trial court so 
that the proper sentence could be imposed. 
The case at hand is on point with Shondel. It is clear 
and undoubtful that the conduct which has been described by the 
victim and allegations made against Mr. Spainhower better 
describe violation of the Stalking or Harassment provisions of 
the Utah Code; not the Retaliation Against a Witness provision. 
The victim in this proceeding reportedly indicated that 
Mr. Spainhower had knowingly engaged in conduct that caused her 
to fear bodily injury or to suffer emotional distress. 
Additionally, the victim indicated that Mr. Spainhower had 
communicated a threat to her that he was going to get her. This 
communication was recorded by Officer Terry Peterson. 
4 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, it would best serve justice 
and prohibit a violation of the equal protection and due process 
clauses contained within Article I, §§ 7, 11, 12, 24 of the Utah 
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. This would be accomplished by reducing the Charge 
against Mr. Spainhower to STALKING or HARASSMENT, Class B 
Misdemeanors. The described conduct of Mr. Spainhower best 
depicts conduct prohibited by either of these conflicting and 
overlapping criminal offenses. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of 
June, 1997. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF FAXING/MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be transmitted a 
telefacsimile to (801) 586-2737 and I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
SUPPORTING MOTION TO REDUCE CHARGE, postage prepaid, to: David 
R. Brickey, Iron County Attorney's Office, 97 North Main, Suite 
#1, P.O. Box 428, Cedar City, Utah 84720. 
Dated this 18th day of June, 1997. 
U 
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Defendant, in this case, only had one encounter with the victim to support a criminal charge. 
Moreover, the relationship between the parties is that of a witness against a defendant in a prior 
criminal case which is exactly the intent behind the criminal offense of Retaliation Against a Witness. 
The Defendant further asserts that he is entitled to a reduction to the offense of Harassment, 
a Class B Misdemeanor, as set forth in Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 106, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended. The crime of Harassment requires the State of Utah to prove, among other elements, that 
the Defendant "communicated a written or recorded threat to commit any violent felony." There is 
absolutely no evidence in this case that the Defendant communicated in writing or recorded any threat 
to commit a violent felony. Again, the offense is not applicable to the underlying facts of this criminal 
case. 
The State of Utah respectfully requests, after oral argument, that the Court deny the 
Defendant's Motion to Reduce Charge. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED. 
DATED this 2$'- day of June, 1997. 
SCOTT M. BURNS 
Iron County Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true, and correct copy of the within and foregoing 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REDUCE CHARGE, by first-class mail, 
02 rl 
postage fully prepaid, on this L\J ~ day of June, 1997, to the following, to wit: 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
CASE N 
'PONI CO- ^T 
Ma - J J*- ^J JL.-J 
AUG 2 21997 
This matter came before the Court on August 4, 1997, for oral argument on tae" DEPUTY 
defendant's Motion to Reduce the Charges in this case. For the reasons stated hereafter the 
Motion is denied. 
On March 4, 1997, the State of Utah filed an Information in this Court charging the 
defendant with the third-degree felony of Retaliation Against a Witness. The State alleged that 
the defendant did "knowingly and intentionally communicate to a person a threat that a 
reasonable person would believe to be a threat to do bodily injury to the person, because of 
any act performed by the person in his capacity as a witness or informant in an official 
proceeding or investigation." 
The defendant moves to reduce the charge to either stalking or harassment, both of 
which are misdemeanors, on the theory that the conduct of the defendant, even if the State's 
claims are correct, would be covered by the elements of those offenses and therefore the 
defendant should be charged with the lesser offense rather than the greater. 
G02&0 
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The Court has considered the arguments of the defendant. The Court finds that neither 
the crime of stalking nor the crime of harassment applies under the facts in this case. 
The offense of stalking is defined in 78-5-106.5 UCA. One of the elements is that 
there be a course of conduct directed at a specific person. In this case there is no course of 
conduct. There was one incident that led to the charge. Therefore the State's evidence would 
fail if the charge were stalking. In addition stalking does not include the element relating to 
the relationship between the defendant and the threatened person. Under retaliation against a 
witness the State would have to prove that the threat was made because the person threatened 
was a witness or informant in an official proceeding or investigation. There is no such 
element in the stalking statute. It is apparent that the legislature has chosen to distinguish 
between those who commit the crime of stalking, which is treated as a misdemeanor, and those 
who threaten witnesses in official proceedings, which is treated as a felony. The distinction is 
important and differentiates between those two charges. 
The defendant also argues that the charge of harassment is the applicable charge in this 
case. Harassment requires the communication of a written or recorded threat to commit any 
violent felony. No such threat exists in this case. The threat was oral, not written or 
recorded, and the threat was not specifically to commit a violent felony. 
For the reasons stated herein above the Motion to Reduce the Charge is denied. 
DATED this 21st day of August 1997. 
J. PHILIP EVES, District Court Judge 
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